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Since the first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
assessment report (FAR) (IPCC, 1990a), the quantity and depth of sci-
entific research on climate change mitigation has grown enormously. 
In tandem with scholarship on this issue, the last two decades have 
seen relatively active efforts around the world to design and adopt 
policies that control (‘mitigate’) the emissions of pollutants that affect 
the climate. The effects of those emissions are felt globally; mitigation 
thus involves managing the global commons and requires a measure 
of international coordination among nations. But the actual policies 
that lead to mitigation arise at the local and national levels as well 
as internationally. Those policies have included, among others, market-
based approaches such as emission trading systems along with regula-
tion and voluntary initiatives; they encompass many diverse economic 
development strategies that countries have adopted with the goal of 
promoting human welfare and jobs while also achieving other goals 
such as mitigating emissions of climate pollutants. These policies also 
include other efforts to address market failures, such as public invest-
ments in research and development (R&D) needed to increase the pub-
lic good of knowledge about new less emission-intensive technologies 
and practices. International diplomacy — leading to agreements such 
as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol as well as various complementary 
initiatives such as the commitments pledged at the Copenhagen and 
Cancun Conferences of the Parties — has played a substantial role in 
focusing attention on mitigation of greenhouse gases (GHGs).
The field of scientific research in this area has evolved in parallel with 
actual policy experience allowing, in theory, insights from each domain 
to inform the other. Since the 4th assessment report (AR4) of IPCC 
(2007a; b) there have been numerous important developments in both 
the science and practical policy experience related to mitigation. There 
is growing insight into how climate change mitigation policies inter-
act with other important social goals from the local to the national 
and international levels. There is also growing practical experience 
and scholarly research concerning a wide array of policy instruments. 
Scholars have developed much more sophisticated information on how 
public opinion influences the design and stringency of climate change 
mitigation policies. 
Meanwhile, events in the world have had a large impact on how scien-
tific researchers have seen the scale of the mitigation challenge and its 
practical policy outcomes. For example, a worldwide economic reces-
sion beginning around 2008 has affected patterns of emissions and 
investment in the world economy and in many countries has affected 
political priorities on matters related to climate change mitigation.
The present chapter identifies six conclusions. Where appropriate, we 
indicate not only the major findings but also our confidence in the 
finding and the level of supporting evidence. (For an overview of the 
language on agreement and confidence see Mastrandrea et al. (2011).
First, since AR4, annual global GHG emissions have continued 
to grow and reached 49�5 billion tonnes (giga tonnes or Gt) of 
carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2eq) in the year 2010, higher 
than any level prior to that date, with an uncertainty estimate 
at ± 10 % for the 90 % confidence interval� On a per-capita basis, 
emissions from industrialized countries that are listed in Annex I of the 
UNFCCC are on average 2.5 times of those from developing countries. 
However, since AR4, total emissions from countries not listed in Annex I 
have overtaken total emissions from the Annex I industrialized coun-
tries (see glossary for Annex I countries). Treating the 27 members of 
the EU as a single country, about ten large countries — from the indus-
trialized and developing worlds — account for 70 % of world emissions. 
(robust evidence, high agreement) [Section 1.3]. The dominant driving 
forces for anthropogenic emissions include population, the structure 
of the economy, income and income distribution, policy, patterns of 
consumption, investment decisions, individual and societal behaviour, 
the state of technology, availability of energy resources, and land-use 
change. In nearly all countries it is very likely that the main short-term 
driver of changes in the level of emissions is the overall state of the 
economy. In some countries there is also a significant role for climate 
policies focused on controlling emissions. (medium evidence, medium 
agreement) [1.3]
Second, national governments are addressing climate change in 
the context of other national priorities, such as energy security 
and alleviation of poverty� In nearly all countries the most impor-
tant driving forces for climate policy are not solely the concern about 
climate change. (medium evidence, medium agreement) [1.2 and 1.4]. 
Studies on policy implementation show that improvements to cli-
mate policy programs need to engage these broader national priori-
ties. Despite the variety of existing policy efforts and the existence of 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, GHG emissions have grown at 
about twice the rate in the recent decade (2000 – 2010) than any other 
decade since 1970. (robust evidence, high agreement) [1.3.1]
Third, the current trajectory of global annual and cumulative 
emissions of GHGs is inconsistent with widely discussed goals 
of limiting global warming at 1�5 to 2 degrees Celsius above 
the pre-industrial level (medium evidence, medium agreement). 
[1.2.1.6 and 1.3.3] The ability to link research on mitigation of emis-
sions to actual climate outcomes, such as average temperature, has 
not substantially changed since AR4 due to a large number of uncer-
tainties in scientific understanding of the physical sensitivity of the 
climate to the build-up of GHGs discussed in Working Group I of the 
IPCC (WGI). Those physical uncertainties are multiplied by the many 
socioeconomic uncertainties that affect how societies would respond 
to emission control policies (low evidence, high agreement). Acknowl-
edging these uncertainties, mitigating emissions along a pathway that 
would be cost-effective and consistent with likely avoiding warming 
of more than 2 degrees implies that nearly all governments promptly 
engage in international cooperation, adopt stringent national and 
international emission control policies, and deploy rapidly a wide array 





assumptions that are less ideal — for example, with international coop-
eration that emerges slowly or only restricted availability of some tech-
nologies — show that achieving this 2 degree goal is much more costly 
and requires deployments of technology that are substantially more 
aggressive than the least-cost strategies (robust evidence, medium 
agreement) [1.3.3]. The assumptions needed to have a likely chance of 
limiting warming to 2 degrees are very difficult to satisfy in real world 
conditions (medium evidence; low agreement). The tenor of modelling 
research since AR4 suggests that the goal of stabilizing warming at 1.5 
degrees Celsius is so challenging to achieve that relatively few model-
ling studies have even examined it in requisite detail (low evidence, 
medium agreement) [1.3.3]. 
Fourth, deep cuts in emissions will require a diverse portfolio 
of policies, institutions, and technologies as well as changes in 
human behaviour and consumption patterns (high evidence; high 
agreement). There are many different development trajectories capable 
of substantially mitigating emissions; the ability to meet those trajec-
tories will be constrained if particular technologies are removed from 
consideration. It is virtually certain that the most appropriate policies 
will vary by sector and country, suggesting the need for flexibility 
rather than a singular set of policy tools. In most countries the actors 
that are relevant to controlling emissions aren’t just national govern-
ments. Many diverse actors participate in climate policy from the local 
to the global levels — including a wide array of nongovernmental orga-
nizations representing different environmental, social, business and 
other interests. (robust evidence, medium agreement) [1.4]
Fifth, policies to mitigate emissions are extremely complex and 
arise in the context of many different forms of uncertainty� 
While there has been much public attention to uncertainties in the 
underlying science of climate change — a topic addressed in detail in 
the WGI and II reports — profound uncertainties arise in the socioeco-
nomic factors addressed here in WGIII. Those uncertainties include the 
development and deployment of technologies, prices for major primary 
energy sources, average rates of economic growth and the distribu-
tion of benefits and costs within societies, emission patterns, and a 
wide array of institutional factors such as whether and how countries 
cooperate effectively at the international level. In general, these uncer-
tainties and complexities multiply those already identified in climate 
science by WGI and WGII. The pervasive complexities and uncertainties 
suggest that there is a need to emphasize policy strategies that are 
robust over many criteria, adaptive to new information, and able to 
respond to unexpected events. (medium evidence, medium agreement) 
[1.2]. 
Sixth, there are many important knowledge gaps that additional 
research could address� This report points to at least two of 
them� First is that the scholarship has developed increasingly sophisti-
cated techniques for assessing risks, but so far those risk management 
techniques have not spread into widespread use in actual mitigation 
strategies. Risk management requires drawing attention to the interac-
tions between mitigation and other kinds of policy responses such as 
adaptation to climate change; they require more sophisticated under-
standing of how humans perceive risk and respond to different kinds 
of risks. And such strategies require preparing for possible extreme 
climate risks that may implicate the use of geoengineering technolo-
gies as a last resort in response to climate emergencies (limited evi-
dence, low agreement). Second, the community of analysts studying 
mitigation has just begun the process of examining how mitigation 
costs and feasibility are affected by ‘real world’ assumptions such as 
possible limited availability of certain technologies. Improving this line 
of research could radically improve the utility of studies on mitigation 
and will require integration of insights from a wide array of social sci-
ence disciplines, including economics, psychology, political science, 
sociology and others.  
1.1 Introduction
Working Group III (WGIII) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) is charged with assessing scientific research 
related to the mitigation of climate change. ‘Mitigation’ is the effort 
to control the human sources of climate change and their cumula-
tive impacts, notably the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and 
other pollutants, such as black carbon particles, that also affect the 
planet’s energy balance. Mitigation also includes efforts to enhance 
the processes that remove GHGs from the atmosphere, known as 
sinks (see glossary (Annex I) for definition). Because mitigation low-
ers the anticipated effects of climate change as well as the risks of 
extreme impacts, it is part of a broader policy strategy that includes 
adaptation to climate impacts — a topic addressed in more detail in 
WGII. There is a special role for international cooperation on mitiga-
tion policies because most GHGs have long atmospheric lifetimes 
and mix throughout the global atmosphere. The effects of mitigation 
policies on economic growth, innovation, and spread of technologies 
and other important social goals also implicate international concern 
because nations are increasingly inter-linked through global trade and 
economic competition. The economic effects of action by one nation 
depend, in part, on the action of others as well. Yet, while climate 
change is fundamentally a global issue, the institutions needed for 
mitigation exist at many different domains of government, including 
the local and national level. 
This chapter introduces the major issues that arise in mitigation policy 
and also frames the rest of the WGIII Contribution to the AR5. First 
we focus on the main messages since the publication of AR4 in 2007 
(Section 1.2). Then we look at the historical and future trends in emis-
sions and driving forces, noting that the scale of the mitigation chal-
lenge has grown enormously since 2007 due to rapid growth of the 
world economy and the continued lack of much overt effort to con-
trol emissions. This trend raises questions about the viability of widely 
discussed goals such as limiting climate warming to 2 degrees Cel-





conceptual issues — such as sustainable development, green growth, 
and risk management — that frame the mitigation challenge and how 
those concepts are used in practice (Section 1.4). Finally, we offer a 
roadmap for the rest of the volume (Section 1.5).
1.2 Main messages and 
changes from  previous 
assessment
Since AR4, there have been many developments in the world economy, 
emissions, and policies related to climate change. Here we review six 
of the most consequential trends and then examine their implications 
for this Fifth Assessment Report by the IPCC (AR5).  
1�2�1 Sustainable development
Since AR4 there has been a substantial increase in awareness of how 
climate change interacts with the goal of sustainable development 
(see Chapter 4 in this volume and WGII Chapter 20). While there is 
no single widely accepted definition of sustainable development, the 
concept implies integrating economic growth with other goals such 
as eradication of poverty, environmental protection, job creation, 
security, and justice (World Commission on Environment and Devel-
opment, 1987; UNDP, 2009; ADB et al., 2012; OECD, 2012; ILO, 2012; 
United Nations, 2012). Countries differ enormously in which of these 
elements they emphasize, and for decades even when policymakers 
and scientific analysts have all embraced the concept of sustainable 
development they have implied many different particular goals. Since 
AR4, new concepts have emerged that are consistent with this broader 
paradigm, such as ‘green growth’ and ‘green economy’ — concepts 
that also reflect the reality that policy is designed to maximize multiple 
objectives. The practical implications of sustainable development are 
defined by societies themselves. In many respects, this multi-faceted 
understanding of sustainable development is not new as it reflects 
the effort in the social sciences over the last century to develop tech-
niques for measuring and responding to the many positive and nega-
tive externalities that arise as economies evolve — concepts discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 3 of this volume.  
New developments since AR4 have been the emergence of quantita-
tive modelling frameworks that explore the synergies and tradeoffs 
between the different components of sustainable development includ-
ing climate change (e. g., McCollum et  al., 2011; Riahi et  al., 2012; 
Howells et al., 2013).
Scientific research has examined at least three major implications of 
sustainable development for the mitigation of emissions. First, since 
AR4 there have been an exceptionally large number of studies that 
have focused on how policies contribute to particular elements of sus-
tainable development. Examples include: 
•	 The ways that biofuel programs have an impact on poverty allevia-
tion, employment, air quality, rural development, and energy / food 
security (see 11.13), such as in Brazil (La Rovere et al., 2011) and 
the United States (Leiby and Rubin, 2013).  
•	 The socioeconomic implications of climate and energy policies in 
the EU (Böhringer and Keller, 2013; Boussena and Locatelli, 2013).
•	 The impacts of Chinese energy efficiency targets on the country’s 
emissions of warming gases (Hu and Rodriguez Monroy, 2012; 
Paltsev et al., 2012) and the evolution of energy technologies (Xie, 
2009; Zhang, 2010; Guo, 2011; Ye, 2011; IEA, 2013). 
•	 The government of India’s Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mis-
sion (JNNSM) that utilizes a wide array of policies with the goal of 
making solar power competitive with conventional grid power by 
2022 (Government of India, 2009). 
•	 The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which 
was explicitly designed to encourage investment in projects that 
mitigate GHG emissions while also advancing sustainable develop-
ment (UNFCCC, 2012d; Wang et al., 2013). Since AR4, researchers 
have examined the extent to which the CDM has actually yielded 
such dividends for job creation, rural development, and other ele-
ments of sustainable development (Rogger et al., 2011; Subbarao 
and Lloyd, 2011).
Chapters in this report that cover the major economic sectors (Chapters 
7 – 11) as well as spatial development (Chapter 12) examine such poli-
cies. The sheer number of policies relevant to mitigation has made it 
impractical to develop a complete inventory of such policies let alone a 
complete systematic evaluation of their impacts. Since AR4, real world 
experimentation with policies has evolved more rapidly than careful 
scholarship can evaluate the design and impact of such policies. 
A second consequence of new research on sustainable development 
has been closer examination of the interaction between different pol-
icy instruments. Since the concept of sustainable development implies 
a multiplicity of goals and governments aim to advance those goals 
with a multiplicity of policies, the interactions between policy interven-
tions can have a large impact on the extent to which goals are actu-
ally achieved. Those interactions can also affect how policy is designed, 
implemented, and evaluated — a matter that is examined in several 
places in this report (Chapters 3 – 4, 14 – 15).
For example, the European Union (EU) has implemented an Emission 
Trading Scheme (ETS) that covers about half of the EU’s emissions, 
along with an array of other policy instruments. Since AR4 the EU has 
expanded the ETS to cover aviation within the EU territory. Some other 
EU policies cover the same sectors that are included in the ETS (e. g., 
the deployment of renewable energy supplies) as well as sectors that 
are outside the ETS (e. g., energy efficiency regulations that affect build-
ings or agricultural policies aimed at promoting carbon sinks). Many of 





goals, such as energy security or rural economic development, beyond 
just concern about climate change. Even as the price of emission credits 
under the ETS declined since AR4 — implying that the ETS itself was 
having a less binding impact on emissions — the many other mitiga-
tion-related policies have remained in place (Chapters 14 and 15).  
Such interactions make it impossible to evaluate individual policies in 
isolation from other policies that have overlapping effects. It has also 
given rise to a literature that has grown substantially since AR4 that 
explores how policies and measures adopted for one purpose might 
have the ‘co-benefit’ of advancing other goals as well. Most of that 
literature has looked at non-monetary co-benefits (see Sections 5.7, 
7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.A.6) — for example, an energy efficiency 
policy adopted principally with the goal of advancing energy security 
might also lead to lower emissions of GHGs or other pollutants. The 
concept of co-benefits, however, has also raised many challenges for 
economic evaluation of policies, and since AR4 there have been sub-
stantial efforts to clarify how the interactions between policies influ-
ence economic welfare. Such research has underscored that while the 
concept of ‘co-benefits’ is widely used to create the impression that 
policies adopted for one goal yield costless improvements in other 
goals, the interactions can also yield adverse side-effects (see Sections 
3.6.3, 4.2 and 6.6). 
Third, the continued interest in how climate change mitigation inter-
acts with goals of sustainable development has also led to challeng-
ing new perspectives on how most countries mobilize the political, 
financial, and administrative resources needed to mitigate emissions. 
More than two decades ago when the topic of climate change was first 
extensively debated by policymakers around the world, most scholar-
ship treated GHG emissions as an externality that would require new 
policies designed explicitly with the goal of controlling emissions. Con-
cerns about climate change would lead to policy outcomes tailored for 
the purpose of mitigation, and those outcomes would interact with the 
many other goals of sustainable development. Since AR4 policy experi-
ence and scholarship have focused on a different perspective — that 
for most countries a substantial portion of ‘climate policy’ would 
emerge as a derivative of other policies aimed at the many facets of 
sustainable development. A range of policy interventions were identi-
fied in theory to enable integration and optimization of climate change 
policies with other priorities such as land use planning and protection 
of water resources (Muller, 2012; Pittock et al., 2013; Dulal and Akbar, 
2013). Similarly, many of the policies that would reduce emissions of 
GHGs could also have large beneficial effects on public health (Gan-
ten et al., 2010; Li and Crawford-Brown, 2011; Groosman et al., 2011; 
Haines, 2012) (see Sections 6.6, 7.9.2 and WGII 11.9).
These new perspectives on the interactions between climate change 
and sustainable development policies have led to a more realistic view 
of how most governments are addressing the challenges of mitigation. 
However, since AR4 it has also become clear that the totality of the 
global effort remains inconsistent with widely discussed goals for pro-
tecting the climate, such as limiting warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees Cel-
sius. Despite the slowing down of emissions growth rate in the wake 
of the global financial crisis, annual volume of total emissions from 
emerging countries has been surging from the new century (see Sec-
tion 1.3 for more details). And the mitigation progress in the devel-
oped world is slower than expectation, especially when carbon emis-
sions embodied in trade is considered (Steinberger et al., 2012; Aichele 
and Felbermayr, 2012). Moreover, per capita energy consumption and 
emissions of some developing countries remain far lower than that of 
developed countries, suggesting that per capita emissions will rise as 
economies converge (Olivier et al., 2012). 
1�2�2 The world macroeconomic situation 
Shortly after the publication of AR4 in 2007, the world encountered a 
severe and deep financial crisis (Sornette and Woodard, 2010). The cri-
sis, which spread rapidly in the second half of 2008, destabilized many 
of the largest financial institutions in the United States, Europe, and 
Japan, and shocked public confidence in the global financial system. 
The crisis also wiped out an estimated USD 25 trillion in value from the 
world’s publicly traded companies, with particularly severe effects on 
banks (Naudé, 2009; IMF, 2009). The effects of the crisis are evident in 
economic growth — shown in Figure 1.1. The year 2009 witnessed the 
first contraction in global GDP since the Second World War (Garrett, 
2010). International trade of goods and services had grown rapidly 
since the turn of the millennium — from 18 % of world GDP in 2000 to 
28 % in 2008 (WTO, 2011). The crises caused global trade to drop to 
22 % in 2009 before rebounding to 25 % in 2010. The effects of the 
recent economic crisis have been concentrated in the advanced indus-
trialized countries (te Velde, 2008; Lin, 2008; ADB, 2009, 2010). While 
this particular crisis has been large, studies have shown that these 
events often recur, suggesting that there is pervasive over-confidence 
that policy and investment strategies can eliminate such cyclic behav-
iour (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). 
Figure 1.1 reveals that countries were affected by the global economic 
crisis in different ways. The recessions were generally most severe 
in the advanced industrialized countries, but the contagion of reces-
sions centred on the high income countries has spread, especially to 
countries with small, open, and export-oriented economies — in large 
part due to the decline in exports, commodity prices, and associated 
revenues. The crisis has also affected foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and official development assistance (ODA) (IMF, 2009, 2011) with 
few exceptions such as in the area of climate change where ODA for 
climate mitigation and adaptation increased substantially until 2010 
before a decline in 2011 (OECD, 2013). The crisis also had substantial 
effects on unemployment across most of the major economies and on 
public budgets. The slow recovery and deceleration of import demand 
from key advanced economies continued to contribute to the notice-
able slowdown in the emerging market and developing economies 
during 2012 (IMF, 2013). As well, some of the major emerging market 
economies suffered from the end of their national investment booms 
(IMF, 2013). 
Figure 1�1 | Annual real growth rates of GDP by decade (left panel) and since 2000 (right panel) for four groups of countries as defined by the World Bank (World Bank, 2013): 
high-income, mature industrialized countries (HIC), upper-middle-income countries (UMC), lower-middle-income (LMC), and low-income countries (LIC) and globally. The category 
of 49 least developed countries (LDCs) as defined according to the United Nations (United Nations, 2013b) overlaps heavily with the 36 countries that the World Bank classifies as 
‘low-income’. Estimates weighted by economic size and variations to one standard deviation are shown. Growth rates weighted by size of the economy; whiskers on the decadal 
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The continued growth of developing economies, albeit at a slower 
pace than before the crisis, helps to explain why global commodity 
prices, such as for oil and metals, have quickly rebounded (see Fig-
ure 1.2). Another factor that helps explain continued high prices for 
some commodities are reductions in supply in response to weakening 
demand. Among the many implications of high and volatile commod-
ity prices are continued concerns about the availability and security 
of energy and food supply, especially in the least-developed countries. 
Those concerns have also reshaped, to some degree, how problems 
such as global climate change are viewed in many countries and soci-
eties. Where climate change mitigation has linked to these broader 
economic and energy security concerns it has proven politically easier 
to mobilize action; where they are seen in conflict the other economic 
and security priorities have often dominated (Chandler et al. 2002; IEA 
2007; ADB 2009). 
The implications of these macroeconomic patterns are many, but at 
least five are germane to the challenges of climate change mitigation: 
•	 First, the momentum in global economic growth has shifted to 
the emerging economies — a pattern that was already evident in 
the 2000s before the crisis hit. Although accelerated by the recent 
financial crisis, this shift in production, investment, and technol-
ogy to emerging economies is a phenomenon that is consistent 
with the expectation that in a globalized world economy capital 
resources will shift to emerging economies if they can be used with 
greater marginal productivity commensurate with associated risks 
(Zhu, 2011). With that shift has been a shift in the growth of green-
house gas emissions to these emerging economies as well. 
•	 Second, much of this shift has arisen in the context of globaliza-
tion in investment and trade, leading to higher emissions that are 
‘embodied’ in traded goods and services, suggesting the need 
for additional or complementary accounting systems that reflect 
the ultimate consumption of manufacturing goods that cause 
emissions rather than just the territorial place where emissions 
occurred during manufacturing (Houser et al., 2008; Davis and Cal-
deira, 2010; Peters et al., 2011, 2012a) (see also Chapter 5). 
•	 Third, economic troubles affect political priorities. As a general rule, 
hard economic times tend to focus public opinion on policies that 
yield immediate economic benefits that are realized close to home 
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(Kahler and Lake, 2013). Long-term goals, such as global climate 
protection, suffer unless they are framed to resonate with these 
other, immediate goals. Chapter 2 of this volume looks in more 
detail at the wider array of factors that affect how humans per-
ceive and manage risks that are spread out over long time hori-
zons. 
•	 Fourth, economic slowdown may also reduce the rate of techno-
logical progress that contributes to addressing climate change, 
such as in energy efficiency (Bowen et al., 2009), but for alterna-
tive views, see (Peters et  al., 2012b). The crisis also has acceler-
ated shifts in the global landscape for innovation (Gnamus, 2009). 
The largest emerging economies have all built effective systems 
for innovation and deployment of new technologies — including 
low emission technologies. Thus ‘technology transfer’ now includes 
‘South-South’ although a central role remains for ‘North-South’ dif-
fusion of technologies as part of a global effort to mitigate emis-
sions (see also Chapters 5 and 16). 
•	 Fifth, commodity prices remain high and volatile despite sluggish 
economic growth in major parts of the world economy. High costs 
for food have amplified concerns about competition between food 
production and efforts to mitigate emissions, notably through the 
growing of bioenergy crops (see 11.13). High prices for fossil fuels 
along with steel and other commodities affect the cost of building 
and operating different energy systems, which could in turn affect 
mitigation since many of the options for cutting emissions (e. g., 
power plants with carbon capture and storage technology) are rel-
atively intensive users of steel and concrete. Relatively expensive 
energy will, as well, encourage conservation and efficiency. Since 
AR4 there have been substantial changes in the availability, cost, 
and performance of energy systems — a topic to which we now 
turn.  
1�2�3 The availability, cost and performance 
of energy systems
The purpose of energy systems — from resource extraction to refin-
ing and other forms of conversion, to distribution of energy services 
for final consumption — is to provide affordable energy services that 
can catalyze economic and social development. The choice of energy 
systems depends on a wide array of investment and operating costs, 
the relative performance of different systems, infrastructures, and life-
styles. These choices are affected by many factors, such as access to 
information, status, access to technology, culture, price, and perfor-
mance (Garnaut, 2011). The assessment of different energy options 
depends critically on how externalities, such as pollution, are included 
in the calculations.
Following a decade of price stability at low levels, since 2004 energy 
prices have been high and volatile (see Figure 1.2). Those prices have 
gone hand-in-hand with substantial geopolitical consequences that 
have included a growing number of oil importing countries focusing on 





























policies surrounding energy security (e. g., Yergin, 2011). Some analysts 
interpret these high prices as a sign of imminent ‘peak production’ of 
exhaustible resources with subsequent steady decline, while others 
have argued that the global fossil and fissile resource endowment is 
plentiful (Rogner, 2012). Concerns about the scarcity of resources have 
traditionally focused on oil (Aleklett et al., 2010), but more recently the 
notions of peak coal (Heinberg and Fridley, 2010), peak gas, and peak 
uranium (EWG, 2006) have also entered the debate (see 7.4).
Sustained high prices have encouraged a series of technological inno-
vations that have created the possibility of large new supplies from 
unconventional resources (e. g., oil sands, shale oil, extra-heavy oil, 
deep gas, coal bed methane (CBM), shale gas, gas hydrates). By some 
estimates, these unconventional oil and gas sources have pushed the 
‘peak’ out to the second half of the 21st century (GEA, 2012), and they 
are a reminder that ‘peak’ is not a static concept. These unconventional 
sources have raised a number of important questions and challenges, 
such as their high capital intensity, high energy intensity (and cost), 
large demands on other resources such as water for production and 
other potential environmental consequences. Consequently, there are 
many contrasting viewpoints about the future of these unconventional 
resources (e. g., Hirsch et  al., 2006; Smil, 2011; IEA, 2012a; Jordaan, 
2012; Rogner et al., 2012). 
The importance of these new resources is underscored by the rapid 
rise of unconventional shale gas supplies in North America — a tech-
nology that had barely any impact on gas supplies at the time that 
the AR4 was being finalized in 2006, but that by 2010 accounted for 
one-fifth of North American gas supply with exploratory drilling else-
where in the world now under way. This potential for large new gas 
supplies — not only from shale gas but also coal-bed methane, deep 
gas, and other sources — could lower emissions where gas competes 
with coal if gas losses and additional energy requirements for the frac-
turing process can be kept relatively small. (A modern gas-fired power 
plant emits about half the CO2 per unit of electricity than a compara-
ble coal-fired unit.) In the United States, 49 % of net electricity genera-
tion came from coal in 2006; by 2011 that share had declined to 43 % 
and by 2012 that share had declined to 37 % and could decline further 
as traditional coal plants face new environmental regulations as well 
as the competition from inexpensive natural gas (EIA, 2013a; b; d). 
Worldwide, however, most baseline projections still envision robust 
growth in the utilization of coal, which already is one of the fastest 
growing fuels with total consumption rising 50 % between 2000 and 
2010 (IEA, 2011a). The future of coal hinges, in particular, on large 
emerging economies such as China and India as well as the diffu-
sion of technologies that allow coal combustion with lower emissions 
(GEA, 2012).
An option of particular interest for mitigating emissions is carbon diox-
ide capture and storage (CCS), which would allow for the utilization of 
coal while cutting emissions. Without CCS or some other advanced coal 
combustion system, coal is the most emission intensive of all the major 
fossil fuels yet, as we discuss below, consumption of coal is expanding 
rapidly. Thus, since AR4, CCS has figured prominently in many stud-
ies that look at the potential for large cuts in global emissions (IEA, 
2010a, 2011b; GEA, 2012). However, CCS still has not attracted much 
tangible investment. By mid-2012 there were eight large-scale projects 
in operation globally and a further eight under construction. The total 
CO2 emissions avoided by all 16 projects in operation or under con-
struction will be about 36 million tonnes a year by 2015, which is less 
than 0.1 % of total expected world emissions that year (Global CCS 
Institute, 2012). CCS is much discussed as an option for mitigation but 
not much deployed. The fuller implementation of large-scale CCS sys-
tems generally requires extensive funding and an array of complemen-
tary institutional arrangements such as legal frameworks for assigning 
liability for long-term storage of CO2. Since AR4, studies have under-
scored a growing number of practical challenges to commercial invest-
ment in CCS (IEA 2010b) (see also Chapter 7). 
Since AR4, innovation and deployment of renewable energy supplies 
has been particularly notable (IEA, 2012a; GEA, 2012). The IPCC Spe-
cial Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Miti-
gation (SRREN) (IPCC, 2011) provides a comprehensive assessment 
of the potential role of renewables in reducing GHG emissions. Glob-
ally wind electricity generating capacity has, for example, experienced 
double-digit annual growth rates since 2005 with an increasing share 
in developing countries. While still being only a small part of the world 
energy system, renewable technology capacities, especially wind but 
also solar, are growing so rapidly that their potential for large scale 
growth is hard to assess but could be very large (IEA, 2011b; GEA, 
2012). Renewable energy potentials exist not only for stationary users 
via electricity but also for transportation through biofuels and electric-
powered vehicles (see 11.13). Renewable energy technologies appear 
to hold great promise, but like all major sources of energy they also 
come with an array of concerns. Many renewable sources of electric-
ity are variable and intermittent, which can make them difficult to 
integrate into electric grids at scale (see Chapter 7; Chapter 8 in IPCC, 
2011). Some biofuels are contested due to fears for food security and 
high lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions of some fuel types (see Chap-
ter 2 in IPCC, 2011; Delucchi, 2010). Other concerns are financial, since 
nearly every major market for renewable energy has relied heavily on 
a variety of policy support such as subsidies, leading investors and 
analysts alike to wonder whether and how these energy sources will 
continue to be viable for investors if subsidies are curtailed. Indeed, 
some governments concerned about the size of public budgets have 
pared back subsidies and claimed that additional cutbacks will be 
forth coming.
Since AR4, there have also been substantial advances in the technolog-
ical possibilities for making energy systems more efficient and respon-
sive. The use of energy efficient devices, plants, and equipment has 
been legislated in many jurisdictions (RISØ, 2011). Integrating informa-
tion and communication technology (ICT) into energy networks offers 
the potential to deliver and use energy more efficiently and flexibly, 
which could make it much easier to integrate variable and intermittent 





storage technologies could also play a central role.) This interconnec-
tion offers the promise of energy systems — especially in electricity, 
where the potential for pervasive use of ICT is often called a ‘smart 
grid’ — that integrate demand response with supplies, allowing for 
smooth and reliable operation of grids even with fluctuating renew-
able supplies (EPRI, 2011). Innovations of this type may also interact 
with behavioural changes that can have large effects on emissions 
as well. For example, greater flexibility and efficiency could encour-
age consumers to use more energy, partially offsetting the benefits of 
these investments in smarter energy supply networks. Or, close atten-
tion to energy supplies could encourage shifts in behaviour that are 
much more frugal with energy (see Chapter 7).
A central challenge in shifting to clean energy supplies and to creat-
ing much more efficient end-use of energy is that many energy tech-
nologies require large capital costs with long time horizons. Thus, even 
when such technologies are cost-effective they may face barriers to 
entry if investors and users are not confident that needed policy and 
market support will be reliable. Innovations in financing — for example, 
mechanisms that allow households to lease solar panels rather than 
pay the full cost up front — can play a role in addressing such issues, 
as can public schemes to fund initial deployment of new technologies. 
Such arrangements are part of a broader effort often called ‘market 
transformation’ that, if implemented well, can lead to new trajectories 
for deployment of technologies that otherwise would face many barri-
ers to entry (IEA, 2010c). 
Since AR4, a large number of governments have begun to explore 
the expansion or introduction of nuclear power. They have also faced 
many challenges in the deployment and management of this tech-
nology. Countries with active nuclear power programmes have been 
contemplating replacing aging plants with new builds or expanding 
the share of nuclear power in their electricity mix for reasons of eco-
nomics, supply security, and mitigation of climate change. In addition, 
more than 20 countries, currently, that have never had commercial 
reactors have launched national programmes in preparation for the 
introduction of the technology, and several newcomer countries have 
entered contractual arrangements with vendors (IAEA, 2011). 
After the Fukushima accident in March 2011, an event that forced 
Japan to review its energy policy substantially, the future patterns in 
nuclear power investment have become more difficult to parse. Some 
countries have scaled back nuclear investment plans or ruled out 
new build (e. g., Switzerland, Belgium); some, notably Germany, have 
decided to close existing reactors. In the United States, since AR4, sev-
eral reactors have been slated for closure and owners have announced 
that still more closures are possible — mainly for reasons of economic 
competitiveness since aging reactors can be costly to maintain in the 
face of less expensive gas-fired electricity. At the same time, in 2013 
construction began on four new reactors in the United States — the 
first new construction in that country in three decades. Several coun-
tries preparing the introduction of nuclear power have extended the 
time frame for the final go-ahead decisions; only few in a very early 
stage of preparation for the introduction stopped their activities alto-
gether. In other countries, including all the countries that have been 
most active in building new reactors (e. g., China, India, Russia, and 
South Korea), there aren’t many noticeable effects from Fukushima 
and the investment in this energy source is accelerating, despite some 
scale-back in the wake of Fukushima (IEA, 2012a). These countries’ 
massive investments in nuclear were much less evident, especially in 
China, India and South Korea, at the time of AR4. 
The Fukushima accident has also increased investment in deployment 
of new, safer reactor designs such as so-called ‘Generation III’ reac-
tors and small modular reactors (see Chapter 7.5.4). Despite all of 
these new investment activities, standard baseline projections for the 
world energy system see nuclear power declining slightly in share as 
total demand rises and other electric power sources are more com-
petitive (IEA, 2012a; EIA, 2013c). In many countries, the future com-
petitiveness of nuclear power hinges on the adoption of policies that 
account for the climate change and energy security advantages of the 
technology.
1�2�4 International institutions and 
 agreements
For more than two decades formal intergovernmental institutions have 
existed with the task of promoting coordination of national policies 
on the mitigation of emissions. In 1992, diplomats finalized the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which 
entered into force in 1994. The first session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) to that Convention met in Berlin in 1995 and outlined 
a plan for new talks leading to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which 
entered into force in 2005. The main regulatory provisions of the Kyoto 
Protocol concerned numerical emission targets for industrialized coun-
tries (listed in Annex B of the Protocol1) during the years 2008 to 2012. 
When AR4 concluded in 2007, diplomats were in the early stages of 
negotiations for possible amendment of the Kyoto treaty while also 
exploring other mechanisms to encourage additional long-term coop-
eration on mitigation. The regulatory targets of the original Kyoto 
treaty would expire at the end of 2012. Those negotiations had been 
expected to finish at the COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen in 2009, but 
a wide number of disagreements made that impossible. Instead, talks 
continued while, in tandem, governments made an array of pledges 
that they solidified at the 2010 COP meeting in Cancun. These ‘Cancun 
pledges’ concern the policies they would adopt to mitigate emissions 
and other related actions on the management of climate risks; some 
of those pledges are contingent upon actions by other countries. The 
1 In this chapter, Annex B countries are categorized as: countries that are members 
of Annex B; countries originally listed in Annex B but which are not members of 
the Kyoto Protocol (non-members are USA and Canada). Countries not listed in 





91 countries that adopted these pledges account for the vast major-
ity (about 80 %) of world emissions (UNFCCC, 2011, 2012a; b; UNEP, 
2012). If fully implemented, the pledges might reduce emissions in 
2020 about one-tenth below the emissions level that would have 
existed otherwise — not quite enough to return emissions to 2005 lev-
els — and it would be very hard to attain widely discussed goals of 
stabilizing warming at 1.5 or 2 degrees without almost immediate and 
full participation in international agreements that coordinate substan-
tial emission reductions (Figure 1.9). International agreements are dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter 13 of this report.
At this writing, diplomatic talks are focused on the goal of adopting 
a new agreement that would raise the level of ambition in mitigation 
and be in effect by 2020 (UNFCCC, 2012c). In tandem, governments 
have also made a number of important decisions, in particular the 
adoption at Doha in 2012 of the second commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol, from 2013 to 2020. However, five developed countries 
originally listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol are not participating 
in the second commitment period: Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Rus-
sia, and the United States (UNFCCC, 2013b).
The growing complexity of international diplomacy on climate change 
mitigation, which has been evident especially since AR4 and the 
Copenhagen meeting, has led policymakers and scholars alike to look 
at many other institutional forms that could complement the UN-based 
process. Some of these initiatives imply diplomatic efforts on separate 
parallel tracks (see Chapter 13). Proposals exist within the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer to regulate some 
of the gases that have replaced ozone-destroying chemicals yet have 
proved to have strong impacts on the climate. A wide array of other 
institutions has become engaged with the climate change issue. The 
G8 — the group of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the 
UK, and the USA that convenes regularly to address a wide array of 
global economic challenges — has repeatedly underscored the impor-
tance of limiting warming to 2 degrees and implored its members to 
take further actions. The G20, a much broader group of economies 
has put climate change matters on its large agenda; the G20 has also 
helped to organize active efforts to reform fossil fuel subsidies and to 
implement green growth strategies. The UN, itself, has a large num-
ber of complementary diplomatic efforts on related topics, such as the 
‘Rio+20’ process. 
Many other institutions are now actively addressing particular 
aspects of climate change mitigation, such as the International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), which focuses on renewable 
energy; the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC), which focuses 
on how limits on short-lived pollutants such as black carbon can 
help slow climate change, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), which focuses on nuclear power, the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organiza-
tion (IMO) that have focused on emissions from bunker fuels, and 
many others with expertise in particular domains. The International 
Energy Agency (IEA) is now extensively engaged in analyzing how 
developments in the energy sector could affect patterns of emissions 
(e. g., IEA, 2012). Looking across these many different activities, inter-
national institutions that have engaged the climate change topic are 
highly decentralized rather than hierarchically organized around a 
single regulatory framework (Keohane and Victor, 2011). Since AR4, 
research on decentralized international institutions has risen sharply 
(Alter and Meunier, 2009; Zelli et al., 2010; Johnson and Urpelainen, 
2012), building in part on similar concepts that have emerged in 
other areas of research on collective action (e. g., McGinnis, 1999; 
Ostrom, 2010).
Since AR4, there has been a sharp increase in scholarly and practical 
attention to how climate change mitigation could interact with other 
important international institutions such as the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) (see also Chapter 13 of this volume) (Brewer, 2010). Rela-
tionships between international trade agreements and climate change 
have been a matter of long standing interest in climate diplomacy and 
are closely related to a larger debate about how differences in envi-
ronmental regulation might affect economic competitiveness as well 
as the spread of mitigation and adaptation technology (Gunther et al., 
2012). A potential role for the WTO and other trade agreements also 
arises because the fraction of emissions embodied in internationally 
traded goods and services is rising with the globalization of manufac-
turing (see 1.2.1.2 above and 1.3.1 below). Trade agreements might 
also play a role in managing (or allowing the use of) trade sanctions 
that could help enforce compliance with mitigation commitments — a 
function that raises many legal questions as well as numerous risks 
that could lead to trade wars and an erosion of political support that 
is essential to the sustainability of an open trading system (Bacchus 
et al., 2010). For example, Article 3 of the UNFCCC requires that “[m]
easures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, 
should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion or a disguised restriction on international trade.” (UNFCCC, 1992). 
The impacts of mitigation on trade issues are also related to concerns 
that have been raised about how emission controls could reduce 
national employment and income (ILO, 2012, 2013).
Since the AR4 in 2007, the scholarly community has analyzed the 
potentials, design, and practices of international cooperation exten-
sively. A body of research has emerged to explain why negotiations on 
complex topics such as climate change are prone to gridlock (Murase, 
2011; Victor, 2011; Yamaguchi, 2012). There is also a large and vibrant 
research program by political scientists and international lawyers on 
institutional design, looking at issues such as how choices about the 
number of countries, type of commitments, the presence of enforce-
ment mechanisms, schemes to reduce cost and increase flexibility, 
and other attributes of international agreements can influence their 
appeal to governments and their practical effect on behaviour (see 
e. g., the comprehensive reviews and assessment on these topics by 
Hafner-Burton, Victor, and Lupu, 2012 as well as earlier research of 
Abbott et al., 2000; and Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, 2001). Much 
of that research program has sought to explain when and how inter-





problems. Such research is part of a rich tradition of scholarship aimed 
at explaining whether and how countries comply with their interna-
tional commitments (Downs et  al., 1996; Simmons, 2010). Some of 
that research focuses on policy strategies that do not involve formal 
legalization but, instead, rely more heavily on setting norms through 
industry organizations, NGOs, and other groups (Vogel, 2008; Buthe 
and Mattli, 2011). The experience with voluntary industry standards 
has been mixed; in some settings these standards have led to large 
changes in behaviour and proved highly flexible while in others they 
have little or no impact or even divert attention (Rezessy and Bertoldi, 
2011). 
One of the many challenges in developing and analyzing climate 
change policy is that there are long chains of action between interna-
tional institutions such as the UNFCCC and the ultimate actors whose 
behaviour might be affected, such as individuals and firms. We note 
that there have been very important efforts to engage the business 
community on mitigation as well as adaptation to facilitate the mar-
ket transformations needed for new emission technologies and busi-
ness practices to become widespread (WEF, 2009; UN Global Compact 
and UNEP, 2012) (see Chapter 15). While there are diverse efforts to 
engage these many different actors, measuring the practical impact on 
emissions has been extremely difficult and much of the scholarship in 
this area is therefore highly descriptive.
1�2�5 Understanding the roles of emissions 
other than fossil fuel CO2
Much policy analysis has focused on CO2 from burning fossil fuels, 
which comprise about 60 % of total global greenhouse gas emis-
sions in 2010 (see Section 1.3.1 below). However, the UNFCCC and 
the Kyoto Protocol cover a wider array of CO2 sources and of warming 
substances — including methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), perfluoro-
carbons (PFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride 
(SF6). Nitrogen trifluoride (NF3) was added as a GHG under the Kyoto 
Protocol for its second commitment period. This large list was included, 
in part, to create opportunities for firms and governments to optimize 
their mitigation efforts flexibly across different substances. The effects 
of different activities on the climate varies because the total level of 
emissions and the composition of those emissions varies. For example, 
at current levels the industrial and power sectors have much larger 
impacts on climate than agriculture (Figure 1.3). 
A variety of studies have shown that allowing for trading across these 
different gases will reduce the overall costs of action; however, many 
studies also point to the complexity in agreeing on the correct time 
horizons and strategies for policy efforts that cover gases with such 
different properties (Reilly et  al., 2003; Ramanathan and Xu, 2010; 
Shindell et  al., 2012). In addition to the gases regulated under the 
Kyoto Protocol, many of the gases that deplete the ozone layer — and 
are regulated under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer — are also strong greenhouse gases (Velders et  al., 
2007). Since AR4 a variety of short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) 
have come under scrutiny (UNEP, 2011a; Shindell et  al., 2012; Victor 
et  al., 2012; Smith and Mizrahi, 2013). Those include tropospheric 
ozone (originating from air pollutant emissions of nitrogen oxides and 
various forms of incompletely oxidized carbon) and aerosols (such as 
black carbon and organic carbon and secondary such as sulphates) 
that affect climate forcing (see Chapter 8, Section 8.2.2 and Section 
5.2). This remains an area of active research, not least because some 
studies suggest that the climate impacts of short-lived pollutants like 
black carbon could be much larger or smaller (Ramanathan and Car-
michael, 2008; Bond et al., 2013) (WGI, Chapters 7 and 8). Such pol-
lutants could have a large role in mitigation strategies since they have 
a relatively swift impact on the climate — combined with mitigation 
of long-lived gases like CO2 such strategies could make it more easily 
feasible to reach near-term temperature goals, but there are still many 
debates over the right balance of mitigation effort on short-lived and 
long-lived pollutants (Ramanathan and Xu, 2010; Penner et al., 2010; 
Victor et al., 2012; Smith and Mizrahi, 2013). By contrast, other aero-
sols — notably the sulphate aerosol formed from SO2 emissions from 
the industrial and power sectors, shipping, and large-scale biomass 
burning — have a net cooling effect because they interact with clouds 
to reflect sunlight back to space (see Section 5.2 and WGI, Chapter 7.4; 
(Fuglestvedt et al., 2009). 
Starting with the FAR, the IPCC has calculated global warming poten-
tials (GWPs) to convert climate pollutants into common units over 20, 
100, and 500 year time horizons (Chapter 2, IPCC, 1990b). Indeed, 
when GWPs were first presented by IPCC the analysis included the 
statement that “[t]hese three different time horizons are presented 
as candidates for discussion and should not be considered as having 
any special significance” (see Chapter 2, page 59 in IPCC, 1990b). 
In the Kyoto Protocol, diplomats chose the middle value — 100 
years — despite the lack of any published conclusive basis for that 
choice (Shine, 2009). That approach emphasizes long-lived pollutants 
such as CO2, which are essential to stopping climate warming over 
many decades to centuries. As shown in Table 1.1, when GWPs are 
computed with a short time horizon the share of short-lived gases, 
notably methane, in total warming is much larger and that of CO2 
becomes proportionally smaller. The uncertainty in the GWPs of 
non-CO2 substances increases with time horizon and for GWP100 the 
uncertainty is about 30 % to 40 % (90 % confidence interval) (IPCC, 
2013a). If policy decisions are taken to emphasize SLCPs as a means 
of altering short-term rates of climate change rises then alternative 
GWPs or other metrics and mitigation strategies may be needed 
(IPCC, 2009; Fuglestvedt et al., 2010; Victor et al., 2012; Daniel et al., 






Figure 1�3 | Panel A (top left): Allocation of total GHG emissions in 2010 (49.5 GtCO2eq / yr) across the five sectors examined in detail in this report (see Chapters 7 – 11). Pullout 
from panel A allocates indirect CO2 emission shares from electricity and heat production to the sectors of final energy use. Panel B (top right): Allocates that same total emissions 
(49.5 GtCO2eq / yr) to reveal how each sector’s total increases or decreases when adjusted for indirect emissions. Panel C (lower panel): Total annual GHG emissions by groups of 
gases 1970 – 2010, along with estimated uncertainties illustrated for 2010 (whiskers). The uncertainty ranges provided by the whiskers for 2010 are illustrative given the limited 
literature on GHG emission uncertainties. Sources: Historic Emission Database IEA / EDGAR dataset (JRC / PBL, 2013, IEA, 2012a), see Annex II.9. Data shown for direct emissions 
on Panels A and B represents land-based CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay that approximate to CO2 flux from anthropogenic emissions sources in the FOLU 
(Forestry and Other Land Use) sub-sector — additional detail on Agriculture and FOLU (‘AFOLU’, together) fluxes is in Chapter 11, Section 11.2 and Figure 11.2 and 11.6. Emissions 
weighted with 100-year GWPs as used in the original Kyoto Protocol (i. e., values from the SAR as those values are now widely used in policy discussions) and, in general, sectoral 
and national / regional allocations as recommended by the 1996 IPCC guidelines (IPCC, 1996). Using the most recent GWP-100 values from the AR5 (see WGI Section 8.6) global 
GHG emission totals would be slightly higher (52 GtCO2eq) and non-CO2 emission shares are 20 % for CH4, 5 % for N2O and 2 % for F-gases. Error bars in panel 1.3c show the 
90 % confidence interval of the emission estimates based on these sources: CO2 from fossil fuel and industrial processes ± 8.4 % (Andres et al., 2012; Kirschke et al., 2013) CO2 
from FOLU ± 2.9 GtCO2 / yr (estimates from WGI table 6.1 with central value shown on figure 1.3c is per EDGAR / IEA); Methane ± 20 % (Kirschke et al. 2013); Nitrous oxide ± 60 % 
(WGI, table 6.9); F-gases ± 20 % (UNEP, 2012). Readers are cautioned, however, that the literature basis for all of these uncertainty figures is very weak. There have been very few 
formal, documented analysis of emissions uncertainty for any gas. Indicative uncertainty for total emissions is from summing the squares of the weighted uncertainty of individual 
gases (see 5.2.3.4 for more detail), which yields a total uncertainty of + / – 9 % for a 90 % confidence interval in 2010. We note, however, that there is insufficient published informa-
tion to make a rigorous assessment of global uncertainty and other estimates suggest different uncertainties. The calculation leading to 9 % assumes complete independence of 
the individual gas-based estimates; if, instead, it is assumed that extreme values for the individual gases are correlated then the uncertainty range may be 19 %. Moreover, the 9 % 
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1�2�6 Emissions trajectories and implications 
for Article 2
Chapter 1 of the WGIII AR4 found that, without major policy changes, 
the totality of policy efforts do not put the planet on track for meeting 
the objectives of Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (IPCC, 2007a). Since then, emis-
sions have continued to grow — a topic we examine in more detail 
below. Article 2 of the UNFCCC describes the ultimate objective of the 
Convention. It states:
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal 
instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to 
achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a 
level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to 
ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
(UNFCCC, 1992). 
Interpreting the UNFCCC goal is difficult. The first part of Article 2, 
which calls for stabilization of GHG concentration at levels that are not 
‘dangerous,’ requires examining scientific climate impact assessments 
as well as normative judgments — points that are explored in detail in 
the WGII contribution. The second part of Article 2 is laden with condi-
tions whose interpretation is even less amenable to scientific analysis. 
In light of the enormous variations in vulnerability to climate change 
across regions and ecosystems, it is unlikely that scientific evidence 
will conclude on a single such goal as ‘dangerous’. Variations in what 
different societies mean by ‘dangerous’ and the risks they are will-
ing to endure further amplify that observation. Article 2 requires that 
societies balance a variety of risks and benefits — some rooted in the 
dangers of climate change itself and others in the potential costs and 
benefits of mitigation and adaptation. 
Since the publication of AR4 a series of high-level political events have 
sought to create clarity about what Article 2 means in practice. For 
example, the Bali Action Plan, adopted at COP 13 held in Bali, Indo-
nesia, in December 2007, cited AR4 as a guide for negotiations over 
long-term cooperation to manage climate change. At the L’Aquila G8 
Summit in 2009, five months before the COP15 meeting in Copenha-
gen, leaders “recognized the broad scientific view that the increase in 
Table 1�1 | Implications of the choice of Global Warming Potential (GWP) for mitigation strategy. Table shows the main geophysical properties of the major Kyoto gases and the 
implications of the choice of values for GWPs with different time horizons (20, 100, or 500 years) on the share of weighted total emissions for 2010; other IPCC chapters report 
detail on alternative indexes such as Global Temperature change Potential (GTP) (Chapter 3; WGI Chapter 8). At present, the 100-year GWPs are used most widely, and we show 
those values as reported in the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) in 1995 and subsequently used in the Kyoto Protocol. Note that CO2 is removed by multiple processes and 
thus has no single lifetime (see WGI Box 6.1). We show CF4 as one example of the class of perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and HFC-134a and HFC-23 as examples of hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs). All other industrial fluorinated gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol (‘F-gases’) are summed. We do not show warming agents that are not included in the Kyoto Protocol, such 
as black carbon. Emissions reported in JRC / PBL (2013) using GWPs reported in IPCC’s Second, Fourth and Fifth Assessment Reports (IPCC, 1995, 2007c, 2013a). The AR4 was used 
for GWP-500 data; interpretation of long time horizon GWPs is particularly difficult due to uncertainties in carbon uptake and climate response — differences that are apparent in 
how different models respond to different pulses and scenarios for CO2 and the many nonlinearities in the climate system (see WGI, Supplemental Material 8.SM.11.4 and Joos 
et al., 2013) and thus IPCC no longer reports 500 year GWPs. Due to changes in the GWP values from AR4 to AR5 the 500-year shares are not precisely comparable with the other 
GWPs reported here. Geophysical properties of the gases drawn from WGI, Appendix 8.A, Table 8.A.1 — final draft data).






(W / m2 / ppb)
SAR (Kyoto)
WGI 
(20 and 100 year from AR5 & 500 year from AR4)
100 years 20 years 100 years 500 years
CO2  various 1.37 x 10 – 5  76 % 52 % 73 % 88 %
CH4           12.4 3.63 x 10 – 4 16 % 42 % 20 %  7 %
N2O        121 3.00 x 10 – 3 6.2 % 3.6 % 5.0 % 3.5 %
F-gases: 2.0 % 2.3 % 2.2 % 1.8 %
HFC-134a          13.4 0.16 0.5 % 0.9 % 0.4 % 0.2 %
HFC-23        222 0.18 0.4 % 0.3 % 0.4 % 0.5 %
CF4  50,000 0.09 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.2 %
SF6    3,200 0.57 0.3 % 0.2 % 0.3 % 0.5 %
NF3 *       500 0.20 not applicable 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Other F-gases ** various various 0.7 % 0.9 % 0.8 % 0.4 %
* NF3 was added for the second commitment period of the Kyoto period, NF3 is included here but contributes much less than 0.1 %.





global average temperature above pre-industrial levels ought not to 
exceed 2 °C,” and they also supported a goal of cutting emissions at 
least 80 % by 2050 (G8 Leaders, 2009). Later that year, an COP 15, dele-
gates ‘took note’ of the Copenhagen Accord which recognized “the sci-
entific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 
degree Celsius,” and later meetings arrived at similar conclusions (Deci-
sion1 / CP.16). Ever since the 2009 Copenhagen Conference the goal of 
1.5 degrees has also appeared in official UN documents, and some dele-
gations have suggested that a 1 degree target be adopted. Some schol-
ars suggest that these goals can create focal points that facilitate policy 
coordination, although there is a variety of perspectives about whether 
these particular goals are playing that role, in part because of grow-
ing evidence that they will be extremely difficult or impossible to attain 
(Schneider and Lane, 2006; National Research Council of the National 
Academies, 2011; Victor, 2011; Helm, 2012). Readers should note that 
each major IPCC assessment has examined the impacts of multiplicity 
of temperature changes but has left political processes to make deci-
sions on which thresholds may be appropriate (WGIII AR4 Chapter 1). 
At present, emissions are not on track for stabilization let alone deep 
cuts (see Section 1.3 below). This reality has led to growing research 
on possible extreme effects of climate change and appropriate policy 
responses. For example, Weitzman (2009) raised the concern that stan-
dard policy decision tools such as cost-benefit analysis and expected util-
ity theory have difficulty dealing with climate change decisions, owing 
to the difficulty in assessing the probability of catastrophic impacts. 
Partly driven by these concerns, the literature on geoengineering options 
to manage solar radiation and possibly offset climate change along 
with technologies that allow removal of CO2 and other climate-altering 
gases from the atmosphere has been increasing exponentially (see 6.9). 
Because they have theoretically high leverage on climate, geoengineer-
ing schemes to alter the planet’s radiation balance have attracted par-
ticular attention; however, because they also create many risks that are 
difficult if not impossible to forecast, only a small but growing number 
of scientists have considered them seriously (Rickels et  al. 2011; Gar-
diner 2010; IPCC 2012; Keith, Parson, and Morgan 2010). 
1.3 Historical, current 
and future trends
Since AR4 there have been new insights into the scale of the mitiga-
tion challenge and the patterns in emissions. Notably, there has been 
a large shift in industrial economic activity toward the emerging coun-
tries — especially China — that has affected those nations’ emission 
patterns. At the same time, emissions across the industrialized world 
are largely unchanged from previous levels. Many countries have 
adopted policies to encourage shifts to lower GHG emissions from the 
energy system, such as through improved energy efficiency and greater 
use of renewable energy technologies. 
1�3�1 Review of four decades of greenhouse 
gas emissions 
While there are several sources of data, the analysis here relies on 
the EDGAR data set (JRC / PBL, 2013) [see Annex  II.9 Methods and 
Metrics for a complete delineation of emission categories]. We focus 
here on all major direct greenhouse gases (GHGs) related to human 
activities — including carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous 
oxide (N2O), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), and 
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). We also examine various ozone-depleting 
substances (ODS), which are regulated under the Montreal Protocol 
due to their effects on the ozone layer but also act as long-lived GHG: 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), and 
halons. Due to lack of comparable data we do not here examine black 
carbon, tropospheric ozone precursors, cooling aerosols, and nitrogen 
trifluoride (NF3.) For the analyses that follow we use 100-year GWPs 
from the SAR because they are widely used by governments, but we 
are mindful that other time horizons and other global warming metrics 
also merit attention (see 1.2.5 above).
By sector, the largest sources of greenhouse gases were the sectors of 
energy production (34 %, mainly CO2 from fossil fuel combustion), and 
agriculture, forestry and land-use (AFOLU) (24 %, mainly CH4 and N2O) 
(Figure 1.3a). Within the energy sector, most emissions originate from 
generation of electricity that is, in turn, used in other sectors. Thus, 
accounting systems in other sectors often refer to direct emissions 
from the sector (e. g., CO2 emissions caused in industry during the pro-
duction of cement) as well as ‘indirect’ emissions that arise outside the 
boundaries of that particular economic sector (e. g., the consumption 
of electric power in buildings causes indirect emissions in the energy 
supply sector (Figure 1.3a and 1.3b). Looking at the total source of 
greenhouse gases at present CO2 contributes 76 %; CH4 about 16 %, 
N2O about 6 % and the combined F-gases about 2 % (Figure 1.3c).
Following the breakdown in sectors discussed in this report (Chapters 
7 to 11), Figure 1.3c looks at emissions over time by gas and sector. 
Figure 1.4 looks at those patterns over time according to different 
groups of countries, which reveals the effects of periodic economic 
slowdowns and contractions on emissions. Globally, emissions of all 
greenhouse gases increased by about 75 % since 1970. Over the last 
two decades, a particularly striking pattern has been the globalization 
of production and trade of manufactured goods (see Section 1.2.1.2 
above). In effect, high-income countries are importing large embodied 
emissions from the rest of the world, mainly the upper middle-income 
countries (Figure 1.5). 
Overall, per-capita emissions in the highly industrialized countries are 
roughly flat over time and remain, on average, about 5 times higher 
than those of the lowest income countries whose per-capita emis-
sions are also roughly flat. Per-capita emissions from upper-middle 
income countries have been rising steadily over the last decade (see 
inset to Figure 1.4). There are substantial differences between mean 





Figure 1�4 | Global growth in emissions of GHGs by economic region. Main figure shows world total (top line) and growth rates per decade, as well as the World Bank’s four eco-
nomic regions (see Figure 1.1 caption for more detail). Inset shows trends in annual per capita mean (solid lines) and median (dotted lines) GHG emissions by region 1970 – 2010 in 
tonnes of CO2eq (t / cap / yr) (United Nations, 2013a). Global totals include bunker fuels; regional totals do not. The data used is from the same sources reported in Figure 1.3c. Error 
bars are approximated confidence interval of 1 standard deviation, derived by aggregating individual country estimates by gas and sector of the 16th and 84th emission percentiles 
provided by the MATCH analysis (Höhne et al., 2011); data also available at http: / / www. match-info. net / . However, we note that this probably over-states actual uncertainty in the 
totals, since individual country uncertainty estimates under this method are implicitly taken to be completely correlated. Thus, for the global totals we estimate a 90 % uncertainty 
range using the same method as discussed for Figure 1.3c. While in 2010 the uncertainty using that method is 9 %, over the full time period of Figure 1.4 the value varies from 9 % 
to 12 % with an average value of 10 %. We caution that multi-country and global uncertainty estimates remain an evolving area of research (see caption 1.3c and Section 5.2.3). 
























































































these categories. Some very low income countries have extremely low 
per-capita emissions while some upper middle income developing 
countries have per-capita emissions comparable with those of some 
industrialized nations.
Emissions from the energy sector (mainly electricity production) and 
from transportation dominate the global trends. Worldwide power sec-
tor emissions have tripled since 1970 (see Figure 7.3), and transport 
has doubled (see Figure 8.1). Since 1990 emissions from electricity and 
heat production increased by 27 % for the group of OECD countries; in 
the rest of the world the rise has been 64 % (see Figure 7.5). Over the 
same period, emissions from road transport increased by 29 % in OECD 
countries and 61 % in the other countries (see Figure 8.3). Emissions 
from these systems depend on infrastructures such as power grids and 
roads, and thus there is also large inertia as those infrastructures are 
slow to change (Davis et al., 2010). 
Forest related GHG emissions are due to biomass burning and decay of 
biomass remaining after forest burning and after logging. In addition, 
the data shown includes CO2 emissions from decomposition of drained 
peatland and from peat fires (Olivier and Janssens-Maenhout, 2012). 
The forest related figures presented here are in line with the synthesis 
paper by Houghton et al. (2012) on recent estimates of carbon fluxes 
from land use and land cover change. 
There has been a large effort to quantify the uncertainties in the histor-
ical emissions since AR4 was published. Such efforts have been difficult 
due to the small number of truly independent data sources, especially 
at the finest level of resolution such as emissions from particular sec-
tors and countries. Uncertainties are particularly large for greenhouse 
gas emissions associated with agriculture and changes in land use. By 
contrast, recent estimates of emissions from fossil fuel combustion var-
ied by only 2.7 % across the most widely used data sources (Macknick, 
2011). In addition to variations in the total quantity of fossil fuel com-
busted, the coefficients used by IPCC to calculate emissions also vary 
from 7.2 % for coal use in industry to 1.5 % for diesel used in road 
transport (Olivier et  al., 2010). Emissions from agriculture and land-
use change are estimated to vary by 50 % (Tubiello et al., 2013), and 
a recent study that compared 13 different estimates of total emissions 
from changes in land use found broadly comparable results (Houghton 
et al., 2012). Since land use is a small fraction of total CO2 emissions 
the total estimate of anthropogenic CO2 emissions has uncertainty of 
only ± 10 % (UNEP, 2012). Looking beyond CO2, estimates for all other 
warming gases are generally more uncertain. Estimated uncertainties 
for global emissions of methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorine based 
gases are ± 25 %, ± 30 %, and ± 20 % respectively (UNEP, 2012).
Statistically significant uncertainty quantifications require large inde-
pendent and consistent data sets or estimates, which generally do 
not exist for historical GHG emission data. In such cases, uncertainty 
is referred to as ‘indicative uncertainty’ based on the limited informa-
tion available that does not meet the standard of a rigorous statistical 
analysis (see 5.2.3).
When adjusting emission statistics to assign indirect GHG emissions 
from electricity and heat consumption to end-use sectors, as is done in 
panel 1.3b, the main sectors affected are the industrial and buildings 
sectors. Those sectors’ shares in global GHG emissions then increase by 
11 % and 12 % to reach levels of 31 % (industry) and 19 % (buildings). 
The addition of these so-called ‘Scope 2’ emissions is sometimes done 
to show or analyze the more comprehensive impact of total energy con-
sumption of these end-use sectors to total energy-related emissions.
Figure 1.4 looks at these patterns from the global perspective over 
time. The AR4 worked with the most recent data available at the time 
(2004). Since then, the world has seen sustained accelerated annual 
growth of emissions — driven by CO2 emissions from fossil fuel com-
bustion. There was a temporary levelling off in 2008 linked to high fuel 
prices and the gathering global economic crisis, but the sustained eco-
nomic growth in the emerging economies has since fuelled continued 
Figure 1�5 | CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion for the four economic regions 
attributed on the basis of territory (solid line) and final consumption (dotted line) in 
gigatonnes of CO2 per year (Gt / yr). The shaded areas are the net CO2 trade balance 
(difference) between each of the four country groupings (see Figure 1.1) and the rest of 
the world. Blue shading indicates that the region is a net importer of emissions, leading 
to consumption-based CO2 emission estimates that are higher than traditional terri-
tory-based emission estimates. Yellow indicates the reverse situation — net exporters of 
embodied emissions. Low-income countries, because they are not major players in the 
global trade of manufactured products, have essentially no difference between territory 
and consumption based estimates. For high-income countries and upper-middle-income 
countries, embodied emissions have grown over time. Figures based on Caldeira and 
Davis (2011) and Peters et al. (2012b), but with data from Eora, a global multi-regional 
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growth in world emissions. This is particularly evident in the economic 
data (Figure 1.1) showing that the large group of countries other than 
the highly industrialized nations continue to grow despite the world 
economic crisis. However, growth rates globally, including in these 
rapidly rising countries, have been slower than the levels seen in the 
1990s, which portends less rapid growth in world emissions. 
Figure 1.6 shows global GHG emissions since 1970 in 20-year intervals 
for the five economic sectors covered in Chapters 7 – 11, i. e., Energy 
Systems, Transport, Buildings, Industry and Agriculture, Forestry and 
Other Land Use (AFOLU). International transport (‘bunkers’) are shown 
separately as these can neither be attributed to any of these economic 
sectors or country grouping. In every country grouping except low-
income countries, total emissions have risen since 1970 with the larg-
est increases evident in energy systems. The only major sector that does 
not display these globally rising trends is AFOLU as a growing number 
of countries adopt policies that lead to better protection of forests, 
improved yields in agriculture reduce pressure to convert natural for-
ests to cropland, and other trends allow for a ‘great restoration’ of pre-
viously degraded lands (Ausubel et al., 2013). In low-income countries 
total emissions are dominated by trends in AFOLU; in all other country 
groupings the energy system plays the central role in emissions.   
It is possible to decompose the trends in CO2 emissions into the vari-
ous factors that ‘drive’ these outcomes — an exercise discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 5. One way to decompose the factors contribut-
ing to total emissions is by the product of population, GDP per capita, 
energy intensity (total primary energy supply per GDP) and the carbon 
intensity of the energy system (carbon emitted per unit energy). This 
approach is also known as the ‘Kaya Identity’ (Kaya, 1990) and reso-
nates with similar earlier work (Holdren and Ehrlich, 1974). A variety of 
studies have done these decompositions (Raupach et al., 2007; Steckel 
et al., 2011; Cline, 2011; Akimoto et al., 2013). Figure 1.7 shows such 
an analysis for the global level, and Chapter 5 in this report offers more 
detailed decompositions.
The analysis reveals enhanced growth in the 2000s of global income, 
which drove higher primary energy consumption and CO2 emissions. 
Figure 1�6 | Greenhouse gas emissions measured in gigatonnes of CO2eq per year (Gt / yr) in 1970, 1990 and 2010 by five economic sectors (Energy supply, Transport, Buildings, 
Industry, as well as Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) and four economic regions (see caption to Figure 1.1). ‘Bunkers’ refer to emissions from international trans-
portation and thus are not, under current accounting systems, allocated to any particular nation’s territory. Note: The direct emission data from JRC / PBL (2013) (see Annex II.9) 
represents land-based CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay that approximate to CO2 flux from anthropogenic emissions sources in the FOLU (Forestry and Other Land 
Use) sub-sector. For a more detailed representation of AFOLU GHG flux (Agriculture and FOLU) see Chapter 11, Section 11.2 and Figure 11.2 and 11.6. Source: same sources as 












































(That pattern levelled around 2009 when the global recession began to 
have its largest effects on the world economy.) Also notable is carbon 
intensity: the ratio of CO2 emissions to primary energy. On average, 
since 1970 the world’s energy system has decarbonized. However, in 
the most recent decade there has been a slight re-carbonization. In the 
portions of the global economy that have grown most rapidly, low-car-
bon and zero-carbon fuels such as gas, nuclear power and renewables 
have not expanded as rapidly as relatively high-carbon coal.
Interpreting the Kaya Identity using global data masks important 
regional and local differences in these drivers. For example, the demo-
graphic transition in China is essentially completed while in Africa pop-
ulation growth remains a sizable driver. Technology — a critical factor 
in improving energy and carbon intensities as well as access to energy 
resources — varies greatly between regions (see Chapters 5 and 7). The 
recent re-carbonization is largely the result of expanded coal combus-
tion in developing countries driven by high rates of economic growth, 
while across the highly industrialized world carbon intensity has been 
declining due to the shift away from high carbon fuels (notably coal) 
to natural gas, renewables, and also to nuclear in some countries. The 
simple Kaya identity relies on broad, composite indicators that nei-
ther explain causalities nor explicitly account for economic structures, 
behavioural patterns, or policy factors, which again vary greatly across 
regions. Technological change might allow for radically lower emis-
sions in the future, but the pattern over this four-decade history sug-
gests that the most important global driver of emissions is economic 
growth. 
Although the average per capita income levels in the large emerging 
economies in 2010 were approximately 30 % or less of the per capita 
income levels of OECD countries in 1980, their levels of carbon inten-
sity and energy intensity are comparable with those of North America 
in the early 1980s (IEA, 2012b). 
1�3�2 Perspectives on mitigation 
Looking to the future, it is important to be mindful that the energy 
system, which accounts for the majority of GHG emissions, is slow to 
change even in the face of concerted policy efforts (Davis et al., 2010; 
WEF, 2012; GEA, 2012). For example, many countries have tried to alter 
trends in CO2 emissions with policies that would make the energy sup-
ply system more efficient and shift to low emission fuels, including 
renewables and nuclear power (Chapter 7).  
There are many different perspectives on which countries and peoples 
are accountable for the climate change problem, which should make 
the largest efforts, and which policy instruments are most practical and 
effective. Many of these decisions are political, but scientific analysis 
can help frame some of the options. Here we look at six different per-
spectives on the sources and possible mitigation obligations for world 
emissions — illustrated in Figure 1.8 and elsewhere in the chapter. This 
discussion engages questions of burden sharing in international coop-
eration to mitigate climate change, a topic addressed in more detail in 
Chapter 4.
One perspective, shown in panel A of Figure 1.8, concerns total emis-
sions and the countries that account for that total. Twenty countries 
account for 75 % of world emissions; just five countries account for 
about half. This perspective suggests that while all countries have 
important roles to play, the overall impact of mitigation efforts are 
highly concentrated in a few. 
A second perspective, shown in panel B of Figure 1.8, concerns the 
accumulation of emissions over time. The climate change problem is 
fundamentally due to the ‘stock’ of emissions that builds up in the 
atmosphere. Because of the long atmospheric lifetime of CO2, a frac-
tion of the CO2 emitted to the atmosphere from James Watt’s steam 
engine that in the late 18th century helped trigger the Industrial Revo-
lution still remains in the atmosphere. Several studies have accounted 
in detail for the sources of emissions from different countries over time, 
taking into account the geophysical processes that remove these gases 
(Botzen et al., 2008; Höhne et al., 2011; Wei et al., 2012). Attributing 
past cumulative emissions to countries is fraught with uncertainty and 
depends on method applied and emissions sources included. Because 
the uncertainties differ by source of emissions, panel B first shows just 
cumulative emissions from industrial sources (left bar) and then adds 
the lowest and highest estimates for emissions related to changes in 
land use (middle two bars). Many studies on the concept of ‘histori-
cal responsibility’ look at cumulative emissions since 1751, but that 
approach ignores the fact that widespread knowledge of the potential 
Figure 1�7 | Decomposition of the change in total annual CO2 emissions from fossil 
fuel combustion by decade and four driving factors; population (light blue), GDP per 
capita (dark blue), energy intensity of GDP (yellow) and carbon intensity of energy 
(red orange). The bar segments show the changes associated with each factor alone, 
holding the respective other factors constant. Total emission changes are indicated by 
a white triangle. The change in emissions over each decade is measured in gigatonnes 
of CO2 per year [GtCO2 / yr]; economic output is converted into common units using 
purchasing power parities; the use of market exchange rates would lower the share 
associated with economic output although that would still be the largest single factor. 
Source: updated from Steckel et al. (2011) using data from IEA (2012c; d).

















































harms of climate change is only a more recent phenomenon — dat-
ing, perhaps, to around 1990 when global diplomatic talks that led 
to the UNFCCC were fully under way. Thus the right bar in panel B 
shows cumulative emissions for all sources of CO2 (including a cen-
tral estimate for sources related to changes in land use) from 1990 to 
2010. Each of these different methods leads to a different assignment 
of responsible shares and somewhat different rankings. Other studies 
have examined other time horizons (e. g., Le Quéré et al., 2012). Many 
scholars who use this approach to analysing historical responsibility 
and similar approaches to assessing possible future contributions often 
refer to a fixed ‘carbon budget’ and identify the ‘gap’ between that 
fixed budget and allowable future emissions (e. g., IPCC, 2013b; UNEP, 
2011b; Chapter 6). 
A few studies have extended the concepts of historical responsibility to 
include other gases as well (den Elzen et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2013). 
For simplicity, however, in panel B we report total cumulative emis-
sions of just CO2, the long-lived gas that accounts for the vast majority 
of long-term climate warming. Adding other gases requires a model 
that can account for the different atmospheric lifetimes of those gases, 
which introduces yet more uncertainty and complexity in the analy-
sis of historical responsibility. The results of such analysis are highly 
sensitive to choices made in the calculation. For example, the share 
of developed countries can be almost 80 % when excluding non-CO2 
GHGs, Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry, and recent emissions 
(until 2010) or about 47 % when including these emissions (den Elzen 
et al., 2013). As a general rule, because emissions of long-lived gases 
are rising, while emissions of the distant past are highly uncertain, 
their influence is overshadowed by the dominance of the much higher 
emissions of recent decades (Höhne et al., 2011). 
A third perspective concerns the effects of international trade. So far, 
nearly all of the statistics presented in this chapter have been orga-
nized according to the national territory where the emissions are 
released into the atmosphere. In reality, of course, some emissions are 
‘embodied’ in products that are exported and discussed in more detail 
in Section 1.2.2. A tonne of steel produced in China but exported to 
the United States results in emissions in China when the fundamen-
tal demand for the steel originated in the United States. Comparing 
the emissions estimated from consumption and production (left and 
right bars of panel A) shows that the total current accounting for world 
emissions varies considerably — with the largest effects on China and 
the United States — although the overall ranking does not change 
much when these trade effects are included. Figure 1.5 earlier in this 
chapter as well as Section 1.2.1.2 present much more detailed infor-
mation on this perspective. 
A fourth perspective looks at per-capita emissions, shown in panel C 
of Figure 1.8. This perspective draws attention to fundamental differ-
ences in the patterns of development of countries. This panel shows 
the variation in per-capita emissions for each of the four country 
groupings. The large variation in emissions in low-income country 
reflects the large role for changes in land use, such as deforestation 
and degradation. There are some low-income countries with per-cap-
ita emissions that are higher than high-income nations. Some studies 
have suggested that debates over concepts such as ‘common but dif-
ferentiated responsibility’ — the guiding principle for allocating miti-
gation efforts in talks under the UNFCCC — should focus on individu-
als rather than nations and assign equal per-capita emission rights to 
individuals (Chakravarty et al., 2009). Still other studies have looked at 
the historical cumulative per-capita emissions, thus combining two of 
the different perspectives discussed here (Teng et al., 2012). Looking 
within the categories of countries shown in panel C, some developing 
countries already have higher per-capita emissions than some industri-
alized nations.
A fifth perspective is the carbon efficiency of different economies. 
Economies vary in how they convert inputs such as energy (and thus 
emissions associated with energy consumption) into economic value. 
This efficiency is commonly measured as the ratio of emission to unit 
economic output (CO2 / GDP) and illustrated in panel D of Figure 1.8. 
Typically, economies at an earlier stage of development rely heavily 
on extractive industries and primary processing using energy intensive 
methods often reinforced with subsidies that encourage excessive con-
sumption of energy. As the economy matures it becomes more efficient 
and shifts to higher value-added industries, such as services, that yield 
low emissions but high economic output. This shift also often includes 
a change from higher carbon primary fuels to less carbon-intensive 
fuels. From this perspective, emission obligations might be adjusted to 
reflect each country’s state of economic development while creating 
incentives for countries to transition to higher economic output with-
out concomitant increases in emissions.
A sixth perspective (panel E of Figure 1.8) looks at the change of emis-
sions between 1990 and 2010. 1990 is a base year for most of the 
Annex B countries in the Kyoto Protocol. That panel divides the world 
into three groups — the countries (listed in Annex B) that agreed to 
targets under the Kyoto Protocol and which formally ratified the Pro-
tocol; countries listed in Annex B but which never ratified the treaty 
(United States) or withdrew (Canada); and countries that joined the 
Kyoto Protocol but had no formal quantitative emission control tar-
gets under the treaty. If all countries listed in Annex B had joined and 
remained members of the Protocol those countries, on average, would 
have reduced emissions more than 5 % between 1990 and the compli-
ance period of 2008 – 2012. From 1990 to 2008 – 2011, the Annex B 
nations have reduced their collective emissions by 20 % excluding the 
United States and Canada and by 9 % if including them, even without 
obtaining emission credits through the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM) (UNFCCC, 2013a). (As already noted, the 
United States never ratified the Kyoto Protocol; Canada ratified but 
later withdrew.) However, some individual countries will not meet 
their national target without the CDM or other forms of flexibility that 
allow them to assure compliance. The trends on this panel reflect 
many distinct underlying forces. The big decline in Ukraine, Russia, the 
12 new members of the EU (EU+12) and one of the original EU mem-























































































































































































































































































































































































































ing of those economies in the midst of a large shift away from central 
planning. Some of those restructuring economies used base years 
other than 1990, a process allowed under the Kyoto Protocol, because 
they had higher emissions in earlier years and a high base year arith-
metically leads to larger percentage reductions. The relatively flat 
emissions patterns across most of the industrialized world reflect the 
normal growth patterns of mature economies. The sharp rise in emerg-
ing markets, notably China and India, reflect their rapid industrializa-
tion — a combination of their stage of development and pro-growth 
economic reforms. 
There are many ways to interpret the message from this sixth perspec-
tive, which is that all countries collectively are likely to comply with the 
Kyoto Protocol. One interpretation is that treaties such as the Kyoto 
Protocol have had some impacts on emissions by setting clear stan-
dards as well as institutional reforms that have led countries to adjust 
their national laws. From that perspective, the presence of the Kyoto 
obligations is why nearly all the countries that ratified the Kyoto obli-
gations are likely to comply. Another interpretation is that the Kyoto 
Protocol is a fitting illustration of the concept of ‘common but differ-
entiated responsibility’, which holds that countries should undertake 
different efforts and that those most responsible for the underlying 
problem should do the most. Still another interpretation is that choice 
of Kyoto obligations largely reveals ‘selection effects’ through which 
countries, in effect, select which international commitments to hon-
our. Countries that could readily comply adopted and ratified bind-
ing limits; the others avoided such obligations — a phenomenon that, 
according to this perspective, is evident not just in climate change 
agreements but other areas of international cooperation as well (e. g., 
Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996; Victor 2011). 
Figure 1�8 | Multiple perspectives on climate change mitigation. Panel A: 2010 emission, ranked in order for the top 75 % of global total. Left bar shows ranking with consumption-
based statistics, and right bar shows territorial-based (see Figure 1.5 for more detail). Panel B: Cumulative emissions since 1750 (left three bars) and since 1990 (right bar) for four 
different methods of emission accounting. The first method looks just at industrial sources of CO2 (left bar); the second method adds to those industrial sources the lowest plausible 
estimate for emissions related to changes in land use (second bar), the third uses the highest plausible estimate for land use (third bar) and the final method uses median estimates 
for land use emissions along with median industrial emissions. (We focus here on uncertainty in land use emissions because those have higher variation than industrial sources.) 
Panel C: ranking of per-capita emissions by country as well as (inset) for the four groupings of countries Shadings show the 10th to 90th percentile range (light) as well as the 25th 
to 75th percentile range (dark); horizontal bars identify the median and diamonds the mean. Panel D: Ranking of carbon intensity of economies (emissions per unit GDP, weighted 
with purchasing power parity) as a function of total size of the economy as well as (inset) for the four groupings of countries Shadings show the 10th to 90th percentile range (light) 
as well as the 25th to 75th percentile range (dark); horizontal bars identify the median and diamonds the mean. Country names are abbreviated using the three letter standardiza-
tion maintained by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO, standard 3166). Panel E: Emissions changes from 1990 to 2012 divided into Annex B of the Kyoto Proto-
col (countries with quantified emission targets, red orange), countries that were eligible for Annex B but are not members (Canada and the United States, yellow) and non-Annex B 
countries (blue). Sources: Panel A: based on Peters et al., 2011 data; Panel B: based on MATCH data (Höhne et al., 2011). High and low plausible values for land use emissions are 
two different datasets provided in the MATCH analysis (see Figure 1.4 for more detail and caveat); since the MATCH analysis is based on actual emission data up to 2005, the last 
four years are were taken from the Historic Emission Database EDGAR / IEA emission data (JRC / PBL, 2013, IEA, 2012a, See Annex II.9). Panel C: JRC / PBL, 2013 and United Nations, 
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Still other interpretations are possible as well, with varied implications 
for policy strategies and the allocation of burdens and benefits among 
peoples and nations.
1�3�3 Scale of the future mitigation challenge 
Future emission volumes and their trajectories are hard to estimate, 
and there have been several intensive efforts to make these projec-
tions. Most such studies start with one or more ‘business-as-usual 
(BAU)’ projections that show futures without further policy interven-
tions, along with scenarios that explore the effects of policies and sen-
sitivities to key variables. Chapter 5 looks in more detail at the long-
term historical trends in such emissions, and Chapter 6 examines the 
varied models that are widely used to make emission projections. 
Using the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database, comprised of those models 
described in Chapter 6 (See Annex  II.10), Figure 1.9 also shows the 
emission trajectories over the long sweep of history from 1750 through 
the present and then projections out to 2100. 
The long-term scenarios shown on Figure 1.9 illustrate the emissions 
trajectories that would be needed to stabilize atmospheric concen-
trations of greenhouse gases at the equivalent of around 450 ppm 
(430 – 480) and 550 ppm (530 – 580) CO2eq by 2100. The scenarios 
centered on 450 ppm CO2eq are likely (> 66 % chance) to avoid a rise 
in temperature that exceeds 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels. 
Scenarios reaching 550 ppm CO2eq have less than a 50 % chance of 
avoiding warming more than 2 degrees, and the probability of limit-
ing warming to 2 degrees further declines if there is significant over-
shoot of the 550 ppm CO2eq concentration. It is important to note 
that there is no precise relationship between such temperature goals 
and the accumulation of emissions in the atmosphere largely because 
the sensitivity of the climate system to changes in atmospheric con-
centrations is not known with precision. There is also uncertainty in 
the speed at which future emissions will be net removed from the 
atmosphere by natural processes since those processes are not per-
fectly understood. If removal processes are relatively rapid and climate 
sensitivity is low, then a relatively large quantity of emissions might 
lead to small changes in global climate. If those parameters prove to 
have less favourable values then even modest increases in emissions 
could have big impacts on climate. These uncertainties are addressed 
in much more detail in WGI Chapter 12 and discussed in Chapter 6 of 
this report as well. While these uncertainties in how the natural system 
will respond are important, recent research suggests that a wide range 
of uncertainties in social systems — such as the design of policies 
and other institutional factors — are likely to be a much larger factor 
in determining ultimate impacts on warming from human emissions 
(Rogelj et al., 2013a; b).
Figure 1.9 underscores the scale of effort that would be needed to 
move from BAU emissions to goals such as limiting warming to 2 
degrees. The rapid rise in emissions since 1970 (left inset) is in stark 
contrast with the rapid decline that would be needed over the com-
ing century. Because it is practically difficult to orient policy around 
very long term goals, the middle inset examines the coming few 
decades — the period during which emissions would need to peak and 
then decline if stabilization concentrations such as 450 or 550 ppm 
CO2eq are to be achieved. 
A variety of studies have probed whether national emission reduction 
pledges, such as those made in the aftermath of the Copenhagen con-
ference, would be sufficient to put the planet on track to meet the 2 
degree target (Den Elzen et al., 2011; Rogelj et al., 2011). For example, 
Den Elzen et al. (2011) found the gap between allowable emissions to 
maintain a ‘medium’ chance (50 – 66 %) of meeting the 2 degree tar-
get and the total reduction estimated based on the pledges made at 
and after COP 15, are as big as 2.6 – 7.7 GtCO2e in 2020; that analysis 
assumed that countries would adopt least-cost strategies for mitiga-
tion emissions, but if less idealized scenarios are followed, then the 
gap would be even larger. A large number of other studies also look 
at the size of the gap between emission trajectories and the levels 
needed to reach goals such as 2 degrees (Clarke et  al., 2009; Cline, 
2011; Yamaguchi, 2012). By logical extension, limiting warming to 1.5 
degrees (or even 1 degree, as some governments and analysts suggest 
should be the goal) is even more challenging. In a major inter-com-
parison of energy models, eight of 14 scenarios found that stabilizing 
concentrations at 450 ppm CO2eq (which would be broadly consistent 
with stabilizing warming at 2 degrees) would be achievable under 
optimal conditions in which all countries participated immediately in 
global regulation of emissions and if a temporary overshooting of the 
450 ppm goal were allowed (Clarke et  al., 2009). As a general rule, 
it is still difficult to assess scientifically whether the Cancun pledges 
(which mainly concern the year 2020) are consistent with most long-
term stabilization scenarios because a wide range of long-term sce-
narios is compatible with a wide range of 2020 emissions; as time 
progresses to 2030 and beyond, there is a tighter constraining rela-
tionship between allowable emissions and long-term stabilization 
(Riahi et al., 2013). The middle inset in figure 1.9 shows those pledges 
and suggests that they may be consistent with some scenarios that 
stabilize concentrations at around 550 ppm CO2eq but are inconsis-
tent with the least cost scenarios that would stabilize concentrations 
at 450 ppm CO2eq.   
There is no simple relationship between the next few decades and 
long-term stabilization because lack of much mitigation in the next 
decades can, in theory, be compensated by much more aggressive mit-
igation later in the century — if new zero- and negative-emission tech-
nologies become available for widespread use. That point is illustrated 
in the upper right inset which shows how assumptions about the tim-
ing of mitigation and the availability of technologies affects a subset 
of scenarios that stabilize concentrations between 450 ppm CO2eq and 
550 ppm CO2eq. Least cost, optimal scenarios depart immediately from 
BAU trajectories. However, such goals can be reached even if there 
are delays in mitigation over the next two decades provided that new 
technologies become available that allow for extremely rapid reduc-
tions globally in the decades immediately after the delay.   
Figure 1�9 | The scale of the mitigation effort needed. Main figure shows the sweep of history from 1750 to 2010 (actual emission estimates) and published projections out to 
the future. Projections include baseline scenarios that do not assume new mitigation policies (grey shading), baseline scenarios that assume aggressive spread of energy efficiency 
technologies and changes in behaviour (purple shading), mitigation scenarios that reach concentration levels of about 550 ppm CO2eq (yellow) and 450 ppm CO2eq (blue). (The 
mitigation scenarios include those that assume optimal regulation over time and those with delays to 2030). The bottom left inset shows recent historical emissions and is the same 
as Figure 1.3c. The top left inset shows the same scenarios from the main figure, but with more detail over the next few decades, including the relationship between the Cancun 
pledges and the various stabilization scenarios. The top right panel looks instead at long-term patterns in emissions and explores the effects of delays to 2030. It focuses on a subset 
of the mitigation scenarios from the main panel that are consistent with limiting atmospheric concentrations of CO2 to about 450 ppm CO2eq to 500 ppm CO2eq — a goal broadly 
consistent with limiting warming to about 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels by 2100 and thus a topic that many models have examined in some detail. The dark green fans 
show model estimates for optimal least cost strategies for stabilization; light green fans show least cost mitigation with emissions that track baseline scenarios until 2030 and then 
make deep cuts with the assumption that new technologies come into place. Chart also shows in light black a subset of scenarios based on the premise that very large quantities 
of net negative emissions (about 40 GtCO2eq / yr by 2100) can be achieved and thus illustrate how assumptions of negative emissions technology may influence the expected time 
path of emissions. The black scenarios, the output of just one model, entail substantial overshoot of concentrations before stabilization is achieved and unlikely to limit warming 
to 2 degrees (see Chapter 6). Sources: Historical data drawn from EDGAR / IEA databases reported in IEA, 2012a See Annex II.9; projections drawn from the WGIII AR5 Scenarios 
Database described in greater detail in Annex II.10; estimates of the impact of the Copenhagen pledges reported in Chapter 13.
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Still other interpretations are possible as well, with varied implications 
for policy strategies and the allocation of burdens and benefits among 
peoples and nations.
1�3�3 Scale of the future mitigation challenge 
Future emission volumes and their trajectories are hard to estimate, 
and there have been several intensive efforts to make these projec-
tions. Most such studies start with one or more ‘business-as-usual 
(BAU)’ projections that show futures without further policy interven-
tions, along with scenarios that explore the effects of policies and sen-
sitivities to key variables. Chapter 5 looks in more detail at the long-
term historical trends in such emissions, and Chapter 6 examines the 
varied models that are widely used to make emission projections. 
Using the WGIII AR5 Scenario Database, comprised of those models 
described in Chapter 6 (See Annex  II.10), Figure 1.9 also shows the 
emission trajectories over the long sweep of history from 1750 through 
the present and then projections out to 2100. 
The long-term scenarios shown on Figure 1.9 illustrate the emissions 
trajectories that would be needed to stabilize atmospheric concen-
trations of greenhouse gases at the equivalent of around 450 ppm 
(430 – 480) and 550 ppm (530 – 580) CO2eq by 2100. The scenarios 
centered on 450 ppm CO2eq are likely (> 66 % chance) to avoid a rise 
in temperature that exceeds 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels. 
Scenarios reaching 550 ppm CO2eq have less than a 50 % chance of 
avoiding warming more than 2 degrees, and the probability of limit-
ing warming to 2 degrees further declines if there is significant over-
shoot of the 550 ppm CO2eq concentration. It is important to note 
that there is no precise relationship between such temperature goals 
and the accumulation of emissions in the atmosphere largely because 
the sensitivity of the climate system to changes in atmospheric con-
centrations is not known with precision. There is also uncertainty in 
the speed at which future emissions will be net removed from the 
atmosphere by natural processes since those processes are not per-
fectly understood. If removal processes are relatively rapid and climate 
sensitivity is low, then a relatively large quantity of emissions might 
lead to small changes in global climate. If those parameters prove to 
have less favourable values then even modest increases in emissions 
could have big impacts on climate. These uncertainties are addressed 
in much more detail in WGI Chapter 12 and discussed in Chapter 6 of 
this report as well. While these uncertainties in how the natural system 
will respond are important, recent research suggests that a wide range 
of uncertainties in social systems — such as the design of policies 
and other institutional factors — are likely to be a much larger factor 
in determining ultimate impacts on warming from human emissions 
(Rogelj et al., 2013a; b).
Figure 1.9 underscores the scale of effort that would be needed to 
move from BAU emissions to goals such as limiting warming to 2 
degrees. The rapid rise in emissions since 1970 (left inset) is in stark 
contrast with the rapid decline that would be needed over the com-
Figure 1�9 | The scale of the mitigation effort needed. Main figure shows the sweep of history from 1750 to 2010 (actual emission estimates) and published projections out to 
the future. Projections include baseline scenarios that do not assume new mitigation policies (grey shading), baseline scenarios that assume aggressive spread of energy efficiency 
technologies and changes in behaviour (purple shading), mitigation scenarios that reach concentration levels of about 550 ppm CO2eq (yellow) and 450 ppm CO2eq (blue). (The 
mitigation scenarios include those that assume optimal regulation over time and those with delays to 2030). The bottom left inset shows recent historical emissions and is the same 
as Figure 1.3c. The top left inset shows the same scenarios from the main figure, but with more detail over the next few decades, including the relationship between the Cancun 
pledges and the various stabilization scenarios. The top right panel looks instead at long-term patterns in emissions and explores the effects of delays to 2030. It focuses on a subset 
of the mitigation scenarios from the main panel that are consistent with limiting atmospheric concentrations of CO2 to about 450 ppm CO2eq to 500 ppm CO2eq — a goal broadly 
consistent with limiting warming to about 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels by 2100 and thus a topic that many models have examined in some detail. The dark green fans 
show model estimates for optimal least cost strategies for stabilization; light green fans show least cost mitigation with emissions that track baseline scenarios until 2030 and then 
make deep cuts with the assumption that new technologies come into place. Chart also shows in light black a subset of scenarios based on the premise that very large quantities 
of net negative emissions (about 40 GtCO2eq / yr by 2100) can be achieved and thus illustrate how assumptions of negative emissions technology may influence the expected time 
path of emissions. The black scenarios, the output of just one model, entail substantial overshoot of concentrations before stabilization is achieved and unlikely to limit warming 
to 2 degrees (see Chapter 6). Sources: Historical data drawn from EDGAR / IEA databases reported in IEA, 2012a See Annex II.9; projections drawn from the WGIII AR5 Scenarios 
Database described in greater detail in Annex II.10; estimates of the impact of the Copenhagen pledges reported in Chapter 13.
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Determining the exact cost required to achieve any particular goal is 
difficult because the models that are used to analyze emissions must 
contend with many uncertainties about how the real world will evolve. 
While the list of those uncertainties is long, the model outcomes are 
particularly sensitive to five that are discussed in much more detail in 
Chapter 6: 
•	 Participation. Studies typically analyze scenarios in which all 
nations participate with the same timing and level of effort, which 
also probably leads to the least costly total level of effort. However, 
a variety of ‘delayed participation’ scenarios are also analyzed, and 
with delays it becomes more difficult (and costly) to meet mitiga-
tion goals (Bertram et  al., 2013; Riahi et  al., 2013; Rogelj et  al., 
2013b; Luderer et al., 2013). 
•	 International institutions. Outcomes such as global participa-
tion will require effective institutions, such as international agree-
ments on emission reductions and schemes like international trad-
ing of emission offsets and financial transfers. If those institutions 
prove difficult to create or less than optimally effective then global 
mitigation goals are harder to reach.
•	 Technology. The least cost outcomes (and greatest ease in meet-
ing mitigation goals) require that all emission control technolo-
gies be available as quickly as possible. In many models, meeting 
aggressive goals also requires the availability of negative emission 
technologies — for example, power plants fired with biomass and 
including carbon dioxide capture and storage. No such plant actu-
ally exists in the world today and with pessimistic assumptions 
about the availability of such technologies it becomes much harder 
or impossible to reach aggressive mitigation goals (Edenhofer 
et  al., 2010; Tavoni et  al., 2012; Eom et  al., 2013; Kriegler et  al., 
2013). 
•	 Economic growth. Typically, these models assume that if eco-
nomic growth is high then so are emissions (and, in some models, 
so is the rate of technological innovation). Of course, in the real 
world, countries can delink economic output and emissions, such 
as through mitigation policy. More pessimistic assumptions about 
growth can make emission goals easier to reach (because there is 
a smaller gap between likely and desired emissions) or harder to 
reach (because technologies will not be invented as quickly). 
•	 Peak timing. Because long-term climate change is driven by the 
accumulation of long-lived gases in the atmosphere (notably CO2), 
these models are sensitive to the exact year at which emissions 
peak before emission reductions slow and then stop accumulation 
of carbon in the atmosphere. Models that allow for early peaks 
create more flexibility for future years, but that early peak also 
requires the early appearance of mitigation technologies. Later 
peak years allow for delayed appearance of new technologies but 
also require more aggressive efforts after the peak. Some models 
also allow for an ‘overshoot’ of peak concentrations, which makes 
it easier for the model to reach long-term stabilization but lowers 
the odds that stabilization will limit actual warming to a particular 
target. 
In general, only when the most flexible assumptions are made — such 
as permission for some temporary overshooting of goals and allow-
ing models the maximum flexibility in the technologies that are uti-
lized — is the result a least cost outcome. Since AR4, the modeling com-
munity has devoted much more attention to varying those assumptions 
to allow for less flexible assumptions that are typically better tuned 
to real world difficulties. These more realistic assumptions are often 
called ‘second best’ or ‘less idealized’. At present, with the most flex-
ible idealized assumptions several models suggest that the goal of 
reaching 2 degrees is feasible. With a variety of less ideal — but more 
realistic — assumptions that goal is much more difficult to reach, and 
many models find the goal infeasible or exceptionally expensive. These 
practical difficulties suggest that while optimal analyses are interest-
ing, the real world may follow pathways that are probably more costly 
and less environmentally effective than optimal outcomes. They are 
also a reminder that such models are a portrayal of the world that 
Figure 1�10 | The effects of real world assumptions on mitigation costs. Relative mitiga-
tion cost increase in case of technology portfolio variations compared to a scenario with 
default technology assumptions for stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentrations centered 
on 450 ppm (430 – 480 ppm, right) and 550 ppm (530 – 580 ppm, left) CO2eq in the year 
2100. Boxplots show the 25th to 75th percentile range with median value (heavy line) 
and unshaded area the total range across all reported scenarios, with the caveat that the 
numbers of scenarios used in such analyses is relatively small. Scenario names on x-axis 
indicate the technology variation relative to the default assumptions: Low Energy Inten-
sity= energy intensity rising at less than standard values, such as due to extensive use of 
energy efficiency programs and technologies (N = 7, 12); No CCS = CCS technologies 
excluded (N = 3, 11); Limited Bioenergy = maximum of 100 EJ / yr bioenergy supply (N = 

























































is necessarily simplified and highly dependent on assumptions. There 
can be many unforeseen changes that make such goals easier or more 
difficult to reach. For example, unexpectedly high economic growth 
and expansion of coal-fired electricity has raised emissions and made 
goals harder to reach; unexpected innovations in renewables, energy 
efficiency and natural gas are possibly making climate goals easier to 
reach.
The importance of these real world approaches to analysis is illustrated 
in Figure 1.10, which shows how different assumptions about energy 
intensity (which is related to human behaviour) and the availability 
of technologies affect the estimated total cost. Compared with costs 
under default technology assumption, if energy intensity is assumed to 
improve rapidly (Low EI) the total cost for mitigating to 430 – 480 ppm 
CO2eq (right boxplot) or 530 – 580 ppm CO2eq (left boxplot) then costs 
are cut in half. (These low EI scenarios are shown, as well, in purple 
on Figure 1.9 — they lead, systematically, to emissions that are signifi-
cantly lower than standard BAU scenarios.) Most studies that look at 
technological and behavioural assumptions conclude that real-world 
costs could be higher than typical, optimal estimates. For example, if 
CCS technologies are not available then the cost of meeting 450 ppm 
stabilization could be 1.5 times to 4 times greater than compared to 
full CCS availability. Similarly, if there is limited bioenergy supply then 
costs could be dramatically higher than standard least cost estimates. 
1.4 Mitigation  challenges 
and strategies
While this report addresses a wide array of subjects related to climate 
change, our central purpose is to discuss mitigation of emissions. The 
chapters that follow will examine the challenges for mitigation in 
more detail, but five are particularly notable. These challenges, in many 
respects, are themes that will weave through this report and appear in 
various chapters. 
1�4�1 Reconciling priorities and achieving 
sustainable development 
Climate change is definitely one of the most serious challenges 
human beings face. However, it is not the only challenge. For exam-
ple, a survey of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) offers 
examples of the wider array of urgent priorities that governments 
face. These goals, worked out in the context of the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration in September 2000, cover eight broad areas 
of development that span eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, 
reducing child mortality, combating HIV / AIDS, malaria and other dis-
eases. Within those broad areas the MDGs include 18 specific tar-
gets. For example, halving, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion 
of people whose income is less than $1 a day, and halving, between 
1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger, are 
among targets under the goal of eradicate extreme poverty and hun-
ger. (Since then, the official poverty level has been revise upwards to 
$1.25 / day by the World Bank.) MDGs are unquestionably the urgent 
issues human beings should cope with immediately and globally. 
Achieving such goals along with an even broader array of human 
aspirations is what many governments mean by ‘sustainable devel-
opment’ as echoed in many multilateral statements such as the dec-
laration from the Rio +20 conference in 2012 (United Nations, 2012). 
All countries, in different ways, seek sustainable development. Each 
puts its priorities in different places. The need to make tradeoffs and 
find synergies among priorities may be especially acute in the least 
developed countries where resources are particularly scarce and 
vulnerabilities to climate change are systematically higher than in 
the rest of the world (see Box 1.1). Those priorities also vary over 
time — something evident as immediate goals such as job creation 
and economic growth have risen in salience in the wake of the global 
financial crisis of the late 2000s. Moreover, sustainable development 
requires tradeoffs and choices because resources are finite. There 
have been many efforts to frame priorities and determine which of 
the many topics on global agendas are most worthy. Making such 
choices, which is a highly political process, requires looking not only 
at the present but also posterity (Summers, 2007). Applying standard 
techniques for making tradeoffs — for example, cost-benefit analy-
sis (CBA) — is extremely difficult in such settings, though the impor-
tance of CBA itself is well recognized (Sachs, 2004) (See Section 3.6). 
Important goals, such as equity, are difficult to evaluate alongside 
other goals that can more readily be monetized. Moreover, with cli-
mate change there are additional difficulties such as accounting for 
low probability but high impact catastrophic damages and estimat-
ing the monetary value of non-market damages (Nussbaum, 2000; 
Weitzman, 2009).
1�4�2 Uncertainty and risk management 
The policy challenge in global climate change is one of risk manage-
ment under uncertainty. The control of emissions will impose costs on 
national economies, but the exact amount is uncertain. Those costs 
could prove much higher if, for example, policy instruments are not 
designed to allow for flexibility. Or they could be much lower if tech-
nological innovation leads to much improved energy systems. Mind-
ful of these uncertainties, there is a substantial literature on how 
policy design can help contain compliance costs, allowing policymak-
ers to adopt emission controls with greater confidence in their cost 
(Metcalf, 2009). 
Perhaps even more uncertain than the costs of mitigation are the 
potential consequences of climate change. As reviewed elsewhere 
in the IPCC assessment, there is growing recognition of the impor-





which could lead to strong feedbacks and very large impacts — for 
example, higher sea levels and substantial impacts on natural eco-
systems (IPCC, 2014 (forthcoming); see also WGI, Chapters 11 – 14 
and Annex  I). Investments in adaptation, which vary in their fea-
sibility, can help reduce exposure to climate impacts and may also 
lessen uncertainty in the assessment of possible and probable impacts 
(World Bank, 2010). 
Since risks arise on both fronts — on the damages of climate change 
and on the costs of mitigation responses — scholars often call this a 
‘risk-risk’ problem. In the case of climate change, management in this 
context of risk and uncertainty must contend with another large chal-
lenge. Mitigation actions and effects of climate change involve a mul-
titude of actors working at many different levels, from individual firms 
and NGOs to national policy to international coordination. The interest 
of those different actors in undertaking climate change mitigation also 
varies. Moreover, this multitude faces a large array of decisions and 
can deploy many different instruments that interact in complex ways. 
Chapter 2 explores the issues involved with this multitude of actors 
and instruments. And Chapter 3 introduces a framework for analys-
ing the varied policy instruments that are deployed and assessing their 
economic, ecological, ethical and other outcomes.
Box 1�1 | Least Developed Countries: mitigation challenges and opportunities
The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) consist of 49 countries 
and over 850 million people, located primarily in Africa and 
Asia — with 34 LDCs in Africa alone (UNFPA, 2011). These coun-
tries are characterised by low income (three-year average gross 
national income per capita of less than USD 992), weak human 
assets index (nutrition, health, school enrolment, and literacy), 
and high economic vulnerability criterion (UNCTAD, 2012a). 
Despite their continued marginalization in the global economy, 
these countries’ economies grew at about 6 % per year from 
2000 to 2008, largely stimulated by the strong pull-effect of the 
Asian emerging economies (Cornia, 2011). However, the global 
economic downturn and the worsening Eurozone crisis have had 
an effect on most LDC economies. In 2011, LDCs grew by 4.2 %, 
1.4 percentage lower than the preceding year, hence mirroring the 
slowdown of growth worldwide (UNCTAD, 2012a). Many of the 
traditional domestic handicaps remain as LDC economies continue 
to be locked into highly volatile external transactions of commodi-
ties and low-productivity informal activities, having neither the 
reserves nor the resources needed to cushion their economies and 
adjust easily to negative shocks. 
Regarding the social trends, LDCs as a group have registered 
encouraging progress towards achieving some of the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDGs), especially in primary school 
enrolment, gender parity in primary school enrolment, HIV / AIDS 
prevalence rates and the share of women in non-agricultural 
wage employment (Sachs, 2012). However, poverty reduction 
has been less successful; only four (of 33) LDCs are on track to 
cut the incidence of extreme poverty to half 1990 levels by 2015 
(UNCTAD, 2011). In line with this, the Istanbul Programme of 
Action, adopted at the 4th UN Conference on the Least Developed 
Countries (LDC-IV) highlighted the importance of building the 
productive base of LDCs’ economies and promoting the process 
of structural transformation involving an increase in the share of 
high productivity manufacturing and an increase in agricultural 
productivity (UNCTAD, 2012b).
The LDCs’ continued reliance on climate-sensitive activities such 
as agriculture means that adapting to climate change remains 
a central focus of economic development. If climate changes 
become acute the additional burden of adaptation could draw 
resources away from other activities, such as mitigation. Alter-
natively, more acute attention to adaptation could help mobilize 
additional efforts for mitigation within these countries and other 
countries that are the world’s largest emitters. The scientific 
literature has not been able to determine exactly when and 
how adaptation and mitigation are complementary or compet-
ing activities in LDCs; what is clear, however, is that meeting the 
climate and development challenge entails integrating mitigation 
and adaptation actions in the context of sustainable develop-
ment (Ayers and Huq, 2009; Martens et al., 2009; Moomaw and 
Papa, 2012). In LDCs, like all other countries, investment in new 
infrastructures offers the opportunity to avoid future GHG emis-
sions and lower mitigation costs (Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011). 
Other emissions avoidance options are also available for LDCs in 
areas of innovative urban development, improvements in material 
productivity (Dittrich et al., 2012) and the application of enhanced 
land use efficiency through intensified agricultural practices and 
sustainable livestock management (Burney et al., 2010). 
There could be significant additional costs associated with the 
expansion of infrastructure in LDCs aimed at decoupling GHG 
emissions and development. Paying these costs in countries with 
extremely scarce resources could be a challenge (Krausmann 
et al., 2009). Moreover, the additional costs could deter private 
investors in low carbon interventions, leaving the public sector 
with additional burdens, at least in the short-term (UN DESA, 
2009; Collier and Venables, 2012). For most LDC governments, 
creating the conditions for accelerated economic growth and 
broad-based improvements in human well-being will remain the 
main driver of national development policies and could lead to the 






Scientific research on risk management has several implications for 
managing the climate change problem. One is the need to invest in 
research and assessment that can help reduce uncertainties. In relation 
to climate change these uncertainties are pervasive and they involve 
investments across many intellectual disciplines and activities, such as 
engineering (related to controlling emissions) and the many fields of 
climate science (related to understanding the risks of climate change). 
In turn, these knowledge generating and assessment processes must 
be linked to policy action in an iterative way so that policymakers can 
act, learn, and adjust while implementing policy measures that are 
‘robust’ across a variety of scenarios (McJeon et  al., 2011). Another 
major implication is the need to examine the possibilities of extreme 
climate impacts. These so called ‘tail’ risks in climate impacts could 
include relatively rapid changes in sea level, feedbacks from melting 
permafrost that amplify the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, or possibly a range of so far barely analyzed outcomes 
(see generally Weitzman 2011). There are many options that could play 
a role in these risk management strategies such as adaptation, rapid 
deployment of low or negative emission technologies (e. g., nuclear, 
advanced renewables, or bioenergy plants that store their emissions 
underground) and geoengineering. Many of these options raise gover-
nance and risk management challenges of their own.
1�4�3 Encouraging international collective 
action
Unlike many matters of national policy, a defining characteristic of the 
climate change issue is that most of its sources are truly global. Nearly 
all climate-altering gases have atmospheric lifetimes sufficiently long 
that it does not matter where on the planet they are emitted. They 
spread worldwide and affect the climate everywhere. Thus, national 
governments develop their own individual policies with an eye to what 
other nations are likely to do and how they might react (Victor, 2011). 
Even the biggest emitters are mostly affected by emissions from other 
countries rather than principally their own pollution. International col-
lective action is unavoidable. 
As the level of ambition to manage the risks of climate change rises, 
collective action can help governments achieve efficient and effective 
outcomes in many ways. Those include not just coordination on poli-
cies to control emissions but also collective efforts to promote adap-
tation to climate change. International coordination is also needed to 
share information about best practices in many areas. For example, 
many of the promising options for reducing emissions involve changes 
in behaviour; governments are learning which policies are most effec-
tive in promoting those changes and sharing that information more 
widely can yield practical leverage on emissions (Aldy and Stavins, 
2007; Dubash and Florini, 2011) (see also Chapter 13). Coordination 
is also essential on matters of finance since many international goals 
seek action by countries that are unwilling or unable to pay the cost 
fully themselves (see Chapter 16) (WEF, 2011). Extremely short-lived 
pollutants, such as soot, do not mix globally yet these, too, entrain 
many issues of international cooperation. Often this pollution moves 
across regional borders. And coordination across borders can also help 
promote diffusion of best practices to limit these pollution sources. 
International cooperation, including financial transfers, can also help dif-
fuse knowledge and capabilities to countries as they adapt to the effects 
of climate change (UNFCCC, 2008, 2012c; World Bank, 2010). Indeed, in 
response to these many logics for international cooperation on mitiga-
tion and adaptation extensive intergovernmental and other coordinat-
ing efforts are under way (see Section 1.2.1.4 and also Chapter 13). 
One of the central challenges in international cooperation is that while 
national governments play central roles — for example, negotiating, 
and implementing treaties — effective cooperation must also engage 
a large number of other actors, notably in the private sector. Moreover, 
governments and other actors cooperate not only at the global level 
through universal forums such as the United Nations but also in a wide 
array of regional forums. One result of these multiple processes that 
entrain public institutions as well as private actors is decentralized and 
overlapping systems for government (see Chapter 13).
1�4�4 Promoting investment and technological 
change 
Radical delinking of GDP growth with emissions will probably require 
massive changes in technology. Achieving those changes will require 
closer attention to policies that affect technology innovation and 
deployment. Technologies vary in many ways — they have different 
maturity stages and potential for improvement through ‘learning’; 
they have different mitigation potentials and require different policy 
responses in developing and developed countries. Many studies have 
looked in detail at how this diversity of technology policy approaches 
might influence emissions and climate policy in the future (UN DESA, 
2009, 2011; WBCSD, 2009; IEA, 2012d). 
Nearly all low GHG technology options share one commonality — a 
shift in the cost structure of supplying energy services from operat-
ing / fuel costs to upfront capital costs. Thus policy options are particu-
larly focused on how to create credible assurances for investors who 
pay these capital costs. Policies that reduce demand for energy — nota-
bly those that mobilize investments in energy efficiency in both end use 
and supply — can play pivotal roles by limiting the total cost needed to 
transform energy supplies. The rate at which these changes in energy 
systems can occur is an important area of research. The high fixed cost 
of infrastructures also create ‘lock-in’ effects that help explain why it 
is difficult to change real world emission patterns quickly (Davis et al., 
2010; IEA, 2012a).
International cooperation, finance, and technology transfer all have 
important roles to play as a catalyst to accelerate technology prog-
ress at each stage in the lifecycle of a technology (see Chapter 13 on 





cess of innovation and diffusion of technologies. For example, massive 
improvements in wind turbine technology have arisen through coopera-
tion between innovators and manufacturers in many different markets. 
Similarly, business has played central roles in innovating and applying 
energy efficiency technologies and practices that can help cut costs 
and allow higher profits and additional employment opportunities. 
(ILO, 2012, 2013). Numerous studies indicate that it will be difficult to 
achieve widely discussed goals such as limiting warming to 2 degrees 
at least without drastic efficiency improvements (but also life style 
changes) (UNECE, 2010; Huntington and Smith, 2011; OECD, 2011; IEA, 
2012d; Riahi et al., 2012). Innovations are needed not just in technol-
ogy but also lifestyles and business practices that often evolve in tan-
dem with technology. For example, after the Fukushima Daiichi accident 
in March 2011, changes in Japanese life style and behaviour curbed 
nationwide domestic household electricity demand by 5 % during the 
winter 2011 / 12 compared with the previous year after accounting for 
degree day differences (Ministry of Environment, Japan, 2012). Simi-
larly, electricity demand in the Tokyo area was around 10 % lower in the 
summer 2011 than in 2010 and about 40 % of the reduction of demand 
resulted from behavioural changes that allowed for greater conserva-
tion of electricity used for air-conditioning (Nishio and Ofuji, 2012). 
As a practical matter, strategies for innovating and deploying new 
technologies imply shifts in policy on many different fronts. In addition 
to the role for businesses, the public sector has a large role to play in 
affecting the underlying conditions that affect where and how firms 
actually make long-lived and at times financially risky investments. 
Those conditions include respect for contracts, a predictable and cred-
ible scheme for public policy, protection of intellectual property, and 
relatively efficient mechanisms for creating contracts and resolving 
disputes. These issues, explored in more detail in Chapter 16, are hardly 
unique to climate change. In addition, there may be large roles for the 
public sector in making public investments in basic technology that 
the private sector, on its own, would not adequately provide — a topic 
covered in more detail in Chapters 3.11 and 15.6.  
1�4�5 Rising attention to adaptation 
For a long time, nearly all climate policy has focused on mitigation. 
Now, with some change in climate inevitable (and a lot more likely) 
there has been a shift in emphasis to adaptation. While adaptation is 
primarily the scope of WGII, there are important interactions between 
mitigation and adaptation in the development of a mitigation strat-
egy. If it is expected that global mitigation efforts will be limited, 
then adaptation will play a larger role in overall policy strategy. If it 
is expected that countries (and natural ecosystems) will find adapta-
tion particularly difficult, then societies should become more heavily 
invested in the efforts to mitigate emissions. 
Mitigation and adaptation also have quite different implications for 
collective action by nations. A strategy that relies heavily on mitigation 
requires collective action because no nation, acting alone, can have 
much impact on the global concentration of GHGs. Even the biggest 
nations account for only about one-quarter of global emissions. By 
contrast, most activities relevant for adaptation are local — while they 
may rely, at times, on international funding and know-how they imply 
local expenditures and local benefits. The need for (and difficulty of) 
achieving international collective action is perhaps less daunting than 
for mitigation (Victor, 2011). 
Developing the right balance between mitigation and adaptation 
requires many tradeoffs and difficult choices (See WG II Chapter 17 for 
a more detailed discussion). In general, societies most at risk from cli-
mate change — and thus most in need of active adaptation — are those 
that are least responsible for emissions. That insight arises, in part, 
from the fact that as economies mature they yield much higher emis-
sions but they also shift to activities that are less sensitive to vagaries 
of the climate. Other tradeoffs in striking the mitigation / adaptation 
balance concern the allocation of resources among quite different 
policy strategies. The world has spent more than 20 years of diplomatic 
debate on questions of mitigation and has only more recently begun 
extensive discussions and policy planning on the strategies needed for 
adaptation. As a practical matter, the relevant policymakers also differ. 
For mitigation many of the key actions hinge on international coordi-
nation and diplomacy. For adaptation the policymakers on the front 
lines are, to a much greater degree, regional and local officials such 
as managers of infrastructures that are vulnerable to extreme weather 
and changes in sea level.
1.5 Roadmap for 
WG III report
The rest of this report is organized into five major sections.
First, Chapters 2 – 4 introduce fundamental concepts and framing 
issues. Chapter 2 focuses on risk and uncertainty. Almost every aspect 
of climate change — from the projection of emissions to impacts on 
climate and human responses — is marked by a degree of uncertainty 
and requires a strategy for managing risks; since AR4, a large number 
of studies has focused on how risk management might be managed 
where policies have effects at many different levels and on a diverse 
array of actors. Scholars have also been able to tap into a rich literature 
on how humans perceive (and respond to) different types of risks and 
opportunities. Chapter 3 introduces major social, economic, and ethi-
cal concepts. Responding to the dangers of unchecked climate change 
requires tradeoffs and thus demands clear metrics for identifying and 
weighing different priorities of individuals and societies. Chapter 3 
examines the many different cost and benefit metrics that are used for 
this purpose along with varied ethical frameworks that are essential to 
any full assessment. Chapter 4 continues that analysis by focusing on 





practices surrounding this concept reflect the many distinct efforts by 
societies and the international community to manage tradeoffs and 
synergies involved with economic growth, protection of the environ-
ment, social equity, justice and other goals.
Second, Chapters 5 – 6 put the sources of emissions and the scale of 
the mitigation challenge into perspective. Chapter 5 evaluates the fac-
tors that determine patterns of anthropogenic emissions of GHGs and 
particulate pollutants that affect climate. Chapter 6 looks at the suite 
of computer models that simulate how these underlying driving forces 
may change over time. Those models make it possible to project future 
emission levels and assess the certainty of those projections; they also 
allow evaluation of whether and how changes in technology, econ-
omy, behaviour and other factors could lower emissions as needed to 
meet policy goals. 
Third, Chapters 7 – 11 look in detail at the five sectors of economic activity 
that are responsible for nearly all emissions. These sectors include energy 
supply systems (Chapter 7), such as the systems that extract primary 
energy and convert it into useful forms such as electricity and refined 
petroleum products. While energy systems are ultimately responsible for 
the largest share of anthropogenic emissions of climate gases, most of 
those emissions ultimately come from other sectors, such as transporta-
tion, that make final use of energy carriers. Chapter 8 looks at trans-
portation, including passenger and freight systems. Chapter 9 examines 
buildings and Chapter 10 is devoted to industry. Together, Chapters 7 – 10 
cover the energy system as a whole. Chapter 11 focuses on agriculture, 
forestry, and other land use (AFOLU), the only sector examined in this 
study for which the majority of emissions are not rooted in the energy 
system. Chapter 11 includes an appendix that delves in more detail into 
the special issues related to bioenergy systems (Section 11.13).
Looking across Chapters 7 – 11 one major common theme is the con-
sideration and quantification of ‘co-benefits’ and ‘adverse side-effects’ 
of mitigating climate change, i. e., effects that a policy or measure 
aimed at one objective might have on other objectives. Measures lim-
iting emissions of GHGs or enhancing sinks often also yield other ben-
efits such as lowering the harmful health effects of local air pollution 
or regional acidification when firms and individuals switch to less pol-
luting combustion technologies and fuels. But fuel switching from coal 
to gas can have adverse side-effects on the jobs in the coal mining 
industry. Although difficult to quantify, these co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects often play a large role in evaluating the costs and benefits 
of mitigation policies (see also Sections 3.6.3, 4.2, 4.8 and 6.6). 
Often, this approach of looking sector-by-sector (and within each sector 
at individual technologies, processes, and practices) is called ‘bottom 
up’. That perspective, which is evident in Chapters 7 – 11 complements 
the ‘top down’ perspective of Chapters 5 – 6 in which emissions are 
analyzed by looking at the whole economy of a nation or the planet. 
Fourth, Chapter 12 looks at spatial planning since many emissions 
are rooted in how humans live, such as the density of population and 
the infrastructure of cities. Matters of spatial planning are treated dis-
tinctly in this report because they are so fundamental to patterns of 
emissions and the design and implementation of policy options.
Fifth, Chapters 13 – 16 look at the design and implementation of policy 
options from a variety of perspectives. Chapter 13 concentrates on 
the special issues that arise with international cooperation. Since no 
nation accounts for more than about one-quarter of world emissions, 
and economies are increasingly linked through trade and competition, 
a large body of research has examined how national policies could be 
coordinated through international agreements like the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and other mechanisms for coopera-
tion. Chapter 14 continues that analysis by focusing on regional coop-
eration and development patterns. 
Chapter 15 looks at what has been learned within countries about the 
design and implementation of policies. Nearly every chapter in this 
study looks at an array of mitigation policies, including policies that 
work through market forces as well as those that rely on other mecha-
nisms such as direct regulation. Chapter 15 looks across that experi-
ence at what has been learned. 
Chapter 16, finally, looks at issues related to investment and finance. 
The questions of who pays for mitigation and the mechanisms that can 
mobilize needed investment capital are rising in prominence in inter-
national and national discussions about mitigation. Chapter 16 exam-
ines one of the most rapidly growing areas of scholarship and explores 
the interaction between public institutions such as governments and 
private firms and individuals that will ultimately make most decisions 
that affect climate change mitigation. Among its themes is the central 
role that financial risk management plays in determining the level and 
allocation of investment financing. 
1.6 Frequently Asked 
Questions
FAQ 1.1 What is climate change mitigation?
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in its 
Article 1, defines climate change as: “a change of climate which is 
attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the com-
position of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natu-
ral climate variability observed over comparable time periods”. The 
UNFCCC thereby makes a distinction between climate change attrib-
utable to human activities altering the atmospheric composition, and 
climate variability attributable to natural causes. The IPCC, in contrast, 
defines climate change as “a change in the state of the climate that 
can be identified (e. g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the 





extended period, typically decades or longer”, making no such dis-
tinction.  
Climate Change Mitigation is a “human intervention to reduce the 
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases” (GHG) (See Glos-
sary (Annex  I)). The ultimate goal of mitigation (per Article 2 of the 
UNFCCC) is preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system within a time frame to allow ecosystems to adapt, 
to ensure food production is not threatened and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
FAQ 1.2 What causes GHG emissions?
Anthropogenic GHGs come from many sources of carbon dioxide 
(CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and fluorinated gases (HFCs, 
PFCs and SF6). CO2 makes the largest contribution to global GHG emis-
sions; fluorinated gases (F-gases) contribute only a few per cent. The 
largest source of CO2 is combustion of fossil fuels in energy conver-
sion systems like boilers in electric power plants, engines in aircraft 
and automobiles, and in cooking and heating within homes and busi-
nesses. While most GHGs come from fossil fuel combustion, about one 
third comes from other activities like agriculture (mainly CH4 and N2O), 
deforestation (mainly CO2), fossil fuel production (mainly CH4) indus-
trial processes (mainly CO2, N2O and F-gases) and municipal waste and 
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